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Abstract
Using data collected in a survey  on risk and social  government are  significantly less likely to continue
insurance  in Chile, Packard finds that workers who  making contributions.  The likelihood of contributions
entered the labor market after the pension reform of  beyond  the eligibility  threshold being lowered  further,
1981  have a greater "contribution density"  than those  the greater  the market rental  value of respondents'
who contributed  to the previous social security  system.  homes.  Furthermore,  individuals with  a greater  tolerance
Further, the expectation  of care from children and the  for risk contribute,  suggesting that there  are retirement
amount spent on  their education  significantly lowers  the  security investments  in Chile that are perceived  as
likelihood of contribution to the pension system.  relatively  less risky than saving in the  reformed  pension
Workers who have  met the contributory  requirements  to  system. The results indicate that housing could  be one
qualify  for the minimum pension guaranteed  by the  such investment.
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conclusions and remaining errors.I. Introduction
In countries  where there are few barriers to participation  in social  insurance erected by a
segmented  labor market - that  is where covered jobs are  not rationed  and workers have
access  to  formal  cover  wherever  they  may be  employed  - a  substantial  portion  of the
population  can  still  fail  to  contribute.  This  may  be  due  to  poverty  throughout  their
working  lives  (insufficient  discretionary  income  to  contribute),  myopia  (an  irrational
disregard for future needs), moral hazard (rational "gaming" of the system),  constrained
liquidity (limited  access to credit that lowers affordable investment in illiquid assets), or a
strong preference for alternative forms of income  security.
Identifying  which  factors  shape  individual  and household  decisions  with respect to the
social insurance  system is critical  in determining whether low rates of participation  are a
cause  for  public  concern.  More  importantly,  a  better  understanding  of household
strategies  to  mitigate  risks  to  income  security  can  indicate  whether  further  policy
interventions  beyond  existing  mandates  would  increase  welfare  or  do  harm.  Greater
knowledge of how constraints and preferences shape savings and insurance decisions can
offer clues as to how formal  social insurance  systems might be further reformed to better
accommodate  the people they are designed to protect.
Earlier work on participation in formal  social security  among the working population  in
Latin America,  has focussed primariiy  on whether workers  had  access to formal  cover.
While the large sample sizes of the data sets employed revealed broad regional patterns,
the  limitations  of those  data  sets  prevented  a  more  thorough  research  of household
choice.  In this  paper,  new survey  data from  Chile  allows  a  closer  examination  of the
factors that shape demand for formal  cover, and how this is affected  by expectations and
perceptions of risk, the availability of alternative  (market and household-based)  resources
of income security in old age, and the implicit set of incentives  embedded in a particular
social insurance regime.
Following  this  introduction,  Section  II  outlines  the  structure  of the  old-age  income
security  system  in  Chile,  detailing  the  "rules of the  game"  in  force  since  the  country's
pension reform in 1981.  Readers familiar with the Chilean system are encouraged to skip
to the next section.  Section III introduces a simple analytical framework borrowed  from
the economics of insurance literature to guide the empirical investigation  in later sections.
Section  IV  presents the  specific  hypotheses  to be  tested.  Section  V describes  the new
data,  focusing  on  previously  unavailable  variables  - an  affiliated  workers'  density of
contributions and  subjective  life  expectancy.  These  data  were  collected  during  the
PRIESO  survey of households  in Greater Metropolitan  Santiago  in December  1999 and
January  2000.1  Section  VI  (a,  b &  c)  presents  and  discusses  the  results of regression
analysis using the new data.  Section VII concludes.
' For more details on the implementation  of the survey  and structure of the questionnaire,  see Appendices
One and Two.
2II.  The Structure of Chile's Old Age  Income Security System
Table  1 presents  the  structure  of the  old  age  income  security  (and  the  closely  related
health security) system established in Chile by structural  reforms in  1981.  Chile's social
security  reform shifted  most of the  risks to income  security in old age  - borne primarily
by  tax  payers  prior to  reform  - onto  the  individual  and the  private  sector.  The  set  of
institutional  arrangements  put  in  place  by  the  reform  is referred  to  as a  "multi-pillar"
social  security  system,  in  that  it  distributes  risks  between  both  public  and  private
institutions.  While  the  system  is  not  fully  administered  by  the  government,  it  is
organized and regulated by government mandate.
The  Chilean  social  security  system  combines  savings,  investment  and  insurance,  both
public and private.  Retirement pensions  are financed primarily out of publicly mandated,
but privately managed  savings  in individual  retirement  accounts.  Participating  workers
contribute  13% of their income to institutional investors  (called AFPs2) who specialize  in
managing and investing retirement savings.  Workers must contribute an additional  7% of
their  monthly  earnings  to  either  the  government  administered  health  service,  or  to  a
private  health insurance  provider,3 bringing the total contribution to approximately  20%
of their income.
Only  10  percentage  points  of workers'  contributions  accumulate  in  their  individual
retirement  accounts  as  savings.  The  remaining  3  percentage  points  pay  the  fund
managers'  fees  and premia for  group level  disability and life  insurance  policies  that the
fund managers  are  required to  contract  for their  contributing  affiliates.4 Workers  who
contribute  into  an individual  retirement  account  for at  least  20 years  are  guaranteed  a
minimum annuity benefit (the minimum pension guarantee,  MPG) from the government,
should  their savings  fall short of a determined  amount when they reach retirement  age.5
2 For "Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones".
3 As  in  most  countries  in  Latin America  prior  to reform,  social security  in Chile  combined  retirement,
disability  and survivor  benefits  with  health  coverage.  The  health system  was  separated  from the rest of
social  security  in  the early stages of the reform.  As was done  for old  age, disability and death,  cover of
health  risk  was partly  privatized to  give  Chilean  workers  a greater  range  of choices  in health coverage.
Most  individuals  are  covered  under  the  publicly  administered  branch  of the  health  system,  FONASA
(Fondo  Nacional  de  Salud).  However,  workers  can  also  opt  to  purchase  coverage  from  the  privately
managed  ISAPREs (Insitutos de Salud y Prevision).  Coverage under FONASA is differentiated  by income
group and can  be either fully or partially  subsidized for the poor and low income  workers.  Those  who do
not  qualify  for  the  subsidy  make  full  contributions  to  the  public  health  service.  Although  they  are
decentralized  and separate from the government  health service,  it is relatively difficult to be covered by the
private  ISAPREs  without proof of contribution  to  an  individual  retirement  account.  Contribution  to  the
ISAPREs and to FONASA are often made together with contributions to the pension system.
4  When  analyzing  coverage  of a  system  of  individual  accounts  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between
workers who are simply affiliated to the system,  and those affiliates who actually  make contributions.  To
be effectively  covered,  affiliation  is  a necessary  condition,  but not  sufficient.  Affiliates  to  the  pension
system  in Chile are  those workers  who  are registered  in the  system and have  an  individual  account.  In
theory,  a Chilean workers can only affiliate with the system once.  A worker remains affiliated even if he is
not making contributions.
5 The contributions to the social security regime made by workers who entered the labor market prior to the
reform are counted toward eligibility  for the minimum guarantee.
3Contributing workers, are therefore, not only saving and investing for their retirement  on
the  capital  market,  but  also  pooling risks  to  income:  publicly  (by  accumulating  rights
toward a minimum retirement  annuity guaranteed by the  government), and privately (by
paying premia  on market  insurance  against  shocks to household  income  from disability
and sudden death during their working  lives6).
As part of the reform and as an incentive to participate  in the new system,  the authorities
in  Chile  lowered  the total  rate of pay-roll  tax on the  income  of workers  who chose  to
switch out of the PAYGO regime and open individual retirement accounts.  The pure-tax
element of mandated  salary deductions  is lowered  further by linking retirement benefits
above the  MPG directly to contributions.  Affiliates must contribute  on an income equal
to  or  greater  than  the  legal  minimum  wage.  Since  contributions  are  tax  exempt,
participants can only contribute up to a ceiling.7 They can make voluntarily contributions
above the required  10% but only on the portion of income up to the contribution ceiling.8
Although  the  reform  eliminated  statutory  employer  contributions,  employers  are
responsible  for depositing  contributions  on  a timely  basis  to  the retirement  and to  the
health systems on their workers'  behalf.9
Just as under the PAYGO regime  that existed prior to the reform, the self employed are
exempted  from  the  mandate  to  contribute  to  the new  system.  Those  who  choose  to
contribute  make their own arrangements  directly with the  retirement  fund managers  and
private health insurance providers.  Having chosen to participate, the self employed must
also contribute  on a declared monthly income equal to or greater than the legal minimum
wage,  and  up to  the  contribution  ceiling.  Chamorro  (1992)  and  Macias  and  Tarzijan,
(1994)  show  that  informal  workers  - that  is  employees  without  a  contract  - can
effectively  exercise  the  same  choices  and  secure  minimum  coverage  without  involving
their employers, by simply declaring themselves to a fund manager as self employed and
contributing  on the legal minimum  wage.  There are, therefore, no explicit, legal barriers
between  any  individual  with  an  income  and  coverage  under  the  system,  although  the
requirement that participants  in the system contribute on declared income at least equal to
6  The  rights  of survivors  and  dependents  of retired affiliates  are  also protected  in the  reformed  system.
Married  men  who  retire  put  aside  funds  to  cover  the  survivor  pension of their  widow  and  dependent
children.  The survivor  benefit  is 60%  of what  the deceased  would  have  been  receiving  as  a retirement
benefit.  The  exact amount  that must be set aside  (based on estimates of how much  longer survivors  will
outlive the deceased),  is  contracted between the affiliate and the private annuity provider.  The law does not
require  the same of married  women  who are retiring,  unless their husband's  are disabled.  (Cox-Edwards,
2000)
7 The ceiling on income  on which  affiliates can  contribute  is set at of 60 "unidades defomento" or UF's -
an accounting unit indexed to inflation.
8 Conventionally,  Chile's retirement savings  system operates on an "EET"  basis: that is,  contributions  and
the returns  from investment are exempt from taxation,  but income tax  is paid on benefits withdrawn  when
an affiliate retires.
9 Several authors  have  pointed  out  that  late payment  of workers'  contributions,  or even  failure to make
payments,  can leave workers.without coverage (Uthoff, 1997, Arenas de Mesa,  1999).
4the minimum  wage,  may  be  a binding  constraint  for the  relatively  low-paid,  informal
employees.
The  minimum  age  of retirement  is  65  for  men  and  60  for  women.  Funds  can  be
withdrawn  as  regular  withdrawals,  an  annuity  contracted  with  a  private  insurance
company,  or  a  combination  of both.  However,  workers  who  by  the  age  of 55  have
accumulated  a  balance  in  their  individual  retirement  account  sufficient  to  finance  a
pension equal to at least  110% of the system's minimum pension guarantee,  can begin to
draw benefits early.  Early retirees  can  continue to work after  they start receiving  their
retirement annuity without the  obligation of making further contributions to the system.
However retirees must continue to contribute  either to the public FONASA or to a private
ISAPRE  for health  coverage,  and  can  choose  to  continue  contributing  to  the  invested
pension funds if they wish.  Funds that remain in the retired  workers'  accounts continue
to earn returns from investment.
As  mentioned  above,  workers  who  reach the contribution  threshold  of 20  years  (240
months)  qualify  for the  minimum  pension  guarantee.  These  workers  have  earned  the
right to an annuity financed initially  out of the funds in their individual  accounts.  When
these funds are exhausted, the  shortfall is financed  with a transfer  from the government.
The  amount  of the  minimum  pension  guarantee  is  not indexed  to  inflation,  but  set by
legislation, and in the last ten years has averaged  about 80% - 95%  of the minimum wage
(Arenas de Mesa, 2000,  Cox-Edwards,  2000).  Both the top-up for the minimum pension
guarantee and the  social  assistance pension,  PASIS,  are financed  from general taxation,
primarily from Chile's value added tax.' 0
The architects of Chile's social  security  reform  expected that the combination of private
and public coverage of risks to income would not only lower future government liabilities
and increase efficiency, but also provide workers with added incentives to save and invest
for  retirement  (Pifiera,  1995).  Two  decades  after  the  introduction  of the  multi-pillar
model in Chile, evidence of an improvement in incentives to participate  in the formal old-
age security  system is mixed.  Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel,  (1994), and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1998) find evidence that there has been an increase in the share of the workforce covered
by  the  national  pension  system  since  individual  retirement  accounts  were  installed.
However,  Edwards and Edwards (2000) find that in 1997, only 62% of the labor force in
Chile  was  contributing to  the reformed  system - about the  same share  of workers  who
contributed to the PAYGO  system prior to reform.  Cortazar (1997)  and Arenas de Mesa
(2000) similarly find no change in the share of contributing  workers.  Pointing to the fall
in the number of affiliates (those who are formally registered in the system) who actually
contribute from year to year, Mesa-Lago  (2001)  and Arenas de Mesa and Sanchez  (2001)
conclude that the reform has not succeeded in providing workers'  with a greater incentive
to participate.
'° Many  authors  have  pointed  out  that  this  contribution-threshold  structure  for eligibility,  reduces  the
marginal value of contributions beyond the twenty year minimum to zero for workers in  the lower levels of
the income  distribution (Vittas,  1995,  Shwarz,  1997, Arenas  de Mesa,  1999).  Cox-Edwards  find that the
MPG mainly benefits  women since they earn relatively  less than similarly qualified men and,  because they
spend relatively less time working outside the home, contribute to the system for fewer years.
5However,  as pointed out in Packard  (2001), the findings of these studies  rely  solely  on
simulations  and  casual  observation  of  the  aggregate  data,  rather  than  econometric
investigation.  The  results  of  the  panel  analysis  in  Packard  (2001)  show  a  positive
incentive effect after the introduction of individual  retirement accounts that increases the
share of the economically  active population who contribute to the pension system, once a
"J"  curve  effect  has  been  taken into  account  and  after  controlling  for changes  in  the
macroeconomic  environment.  This said,  the  numbers of workers  who  contribute to  the
formal retirement  security system in Chile relative to that in OECD countries is still very
low, and guards strongly against  complacency.  The falling share of contributors among
workers  affiliated  to the  reformed  system,  shown  in Figure  1, indicates  that the  wedge
created by the payroll tax to social security prior to reform, was just one of many possible
factors  that  still  lead  certain  groups  of  workers  to  ignore  government  mandated
retirement-income protection.  l
III.  An Analytical  Framework: The "Comprehensive" Insurance Decision
A large portion of the literature  on social  security  and private pensions  is based  on the
life-cycle model of savings.  However,  a more recent literature argues that analysis of the
efficiency  aspects  of  public  interventions  for  old  age  income  security,  should  place
greater emphasis  on risk and  uncertainty  (Bodie,  1990, Thaler  ,1994,  Barr,  1998, 2000,
and  2001,  Holzmann  and  Jorgensen,  2000).  This  recent  emphasis  on  the  insurance
aspects  of pensions  is  a  revival  of an  earlier  focus.  The  analysis  of old  age  income
security  was  firmly  grounded  in  the  realm  of risk  and uncertainty  in  four  theoretical
papers  on "optimal-length-of-working-life insurance", by Diamond  and Mirrlees  (1978,
1982,  1986a, 1986b).
"Workers  face  uncertainty about the  lengths  of their working  lives...  No one
knows  what  work  he  will  be  capable  of in  the  future...  Uncertainty  about
earnings  ability in  the last years of life is particularly  great ...  The burden of this
risk to the individual is eased both by private insurance and by the tax and social
insurance system." (Selectively  drawn  from Diamond and Mirrlees,  1978,  1982,
1986a, and  1986b).
A multi-pillar pension  system of the kind emerging  in Latin America,  combines aspects
of social  insurance  with  private  insurance,  savings  and  investment.  For this  reason,
neither  a  simple  life-cycle  savings  or  insurance  framework  is  fully  satisfactory  for
modeling the preferences  of individuals  and households with respect to the new systems.
Furthermore,  this  research  focuses  on  a  developing  country  where  there  are  more
opportunities  to  evade  social  insurance  than  in  a developed  country,  and  where  non-
" It  is important  to  distinguish  the  contribution  ratio  shown  in Figure  I - contributors as a share of
affiliates to the AFP system - from the ratio  for Chile included  in the  panel analysis  in Packard  (2001)-
contributors  to any branch of  the social security system as a share of  the economically active population.
While the fall  in contributors as a share of affiliates is a cause  for concern,  widely reported  inflation  in the
data  on affiliates  may  exaggerate  the  problem.  Several  authors  have  pointed  out  that  the  data  on  the
number  of affiliates  is flawed  since it can  show that over 100% of the population  is affiliated (Arenas  de
Mesa,  1999, Cox-Edwards,  2000,  Edwards and Edwards,  2000, Mesa-Lago,  2001,  Uthoff,  2001).  These
authors  explain that inaccuracy in the affiliation data  is due to workers re-affiliating under a different name
upon rejoining the  formal  labor force, or upon switching  between pension  fund managers.  In  either case,
the inflation in the denominator (affiliates) can exaggerate the fall in the numerator (contributors).
6market alternatives may be in greater supply.  This feature introduces portfolio aspects to
the decision to participate  in the formal system - that is, relative to the choices  available
to  workers  in  developed  countries  where  governments  have  capacity  to  enforce  the
mandate  to participate,  individuals in developing countries can pick and choose between
a  range  of  publicly  provided,  market  and  non-market  (informal,  family  based)
instruments  to  mitigate  the  loss  of earnings  ability  in  old  age.  Thus,  an  analytical
framework that is sufficiently broad to encompass preferences  with respect to a variety of
instruments  is required to motivate this empirical analysis.
Such  a framework  is available  in the  early  articles  on the  economics  of insurance.  In
their  1972  paper  Ehrlich  and  Becker  combine  expected-utility  and  indifference  curve
analysis  within  the  context  of  a  "state  preferences"  approach  to  behavior  under
uncertainty.  Although  their model abstracts  from the important  inter-temporal  life-cycle
element of insurance  decisions,  it provides several  predictions of optimal risk-mitigating
behavior that lend themselves to empirical tests using cross section survey data.
Their model is straight  forward.  In the face of a prospective  loss, individuals can either
insure against the loss, or take steps to lower the likelihood  that the loss will occur.  The
"comprehensive  insurance" problem  of the  individual  is  to  determine  their  optimal
expenditure  on a set of alternative  instruments - "market insurance", "self-insurance"
and  "self-protection  ".
Both market and self-insurance transfer income from the "good" states to the "bad" states
of the world, lowering the size of losses in the bad states.  Where it is available,  market
insurance  can  be  purchased  at  a price  - the  "premium".  Self-insurance  differs  from
market  insurance  in  that  there  is  no  market  for  it  and  therefore  no  explicit  price.
However,  a  shadow  price  can  be imputed  from the  costs  incurred by  the  individual  in
self-insuring.  The  critical  difference  between  the  two  ways  of insuring  is  that  market
insurance pools risk across individuals,  while self insurance  does not.  Individuals  who
neither  insure  through  a market  nor  self insure  - whether  by  choice  or because  both
instruments  are  missing  - must  cope with the losses  in any bad  states  that occur.  The
third instrument, self-protection, reduces the probability of the bad state, although since it
does  not transfer  income from  good to bad  states,  it does  not affect the size  of the loss
should the bad state come about.-2
Within  the  Ehrlich  and Becker framework,  individuals  smooth  consumption  over  good
and  bad  states  of  the  world.  Where  insurance  markets  are  missing  the  individual
smoothes consumption  using only  self-insurance  and  self-protection.  In a world where
the option of both market insurance  and self-insurance  exist, they are substitutes. Market
insurance  - available  at  or near  actuarially  fair prices'3 - reduces  the  take up of self-
12 The authors admit that, "... it is somewhat artificial to distinguish behavior that reduces the probability of
the  loss  from behavior  that reduces  the  size of a  loss, since  many actions  do  both."  (Erlich  and Becker,
1972,  p.  634)  However, they find it helpful to separate selfprotection from self insurance since the  latter
clearly performs the insurance  function of redistributing income from good to bad states.
13 Conventionally, the price of market insurance  X is said to be "actuarially fair" if or = p /I - p,  where
p is the probability of the bad state occurring.
7insurance.  Market insurance  will be preferred to self-insurance  for mitigating  losses that
are rare, because the shadow price of self-insurance does not fall as the probability of loss
decreases, while the price of market insurance does.  As losses become more rare, and the
individual has more to loose, the incentive to insure through the market rises.'4
Ehrlich  and  Becker  also  find  that  greater  coverage  of  market  insurance  does  not
inevitably result in individuals spending less on self protection  (moral hazard'5).  If self-
protection  lowers the  likelihood that the  bad state will occur,  and if this  is rewarded  by
the  market  in  the  form  of lower  premia,  market insurance  and self-protection  become
complements,  and the  risk of moral  hazard  can  be  lowered.  The  authors acknowledge
that  this  result  depends  critically  on  how  responsive  the  price  of insurance  is  to  the
amount  of self-protection  individuals  engage  in.  Subsequent  literature  on  information
asymmetries  and  market  failures  explains  why  the  price  of insurance  does  not  always
respond,'6 but the fundamental  structure of incentives faced by individuals with access to
a "comprehensive" set  of risk-mitigation  instruments  (market  insurance,  self insurance
and self protection) presented by the authors remains unchanged.
Gill  and  Ilahi  (2000)  use  the  Ehrlich  and  Becker  framework  to  analyze  individual
preferences  when  both  private  and  publicly  provided  instruments  are  available.  They
apply  the  framework  to  prospective  losses  from  unemployment,  analyzing  public
unemployment  insurance  (as market insurance or "market-type"  insurance,  since, even if
publicly  provided,  the  risk  of job-loss  is  pooled);  precautionary  saving  (as  self-
insurance);  and  investments  in  human  capital  (as  self-protection).  The  authors
acknowledge  that  markets  frequently  fail  to  provide  insurance  against  certain  losses,
particularly when the likelihood of the loss is widespread.  Barr (1998, and 2001) points to
the same  failures  of private  insurance  especially  when the  probability  of the  bad state
occurring  cannot  be  estimated,  and  is,  therefore,  an  uncertainty rather  than  simply  a
risk.'7 To compensate  for these failures, governments  step in to provide social insurance
- market-type  risk  pooling  - against  losses  to  which  the market  does  not  respond  or
responds inadequately.  Similarly, government  action can correct distortions that prevent
individuals from achieving optimal levels of self insurance and protection.
I  apply  the  Ehrlich  and  Becker  framework  to  analyze  individual  preferences  for
mitigating  poverty  in  old  age  where  a  range  of public  and  private  instruments  are
14 "This is to say that a person is more likely to insure large rather than small losses.  On the other hand, the
incentive to save for rare loses is small." Erlich and Becker (1972), p. 635
I5  The authors specify "moral  hazard" as an alleged deterrent  effect of market insurance  on self protection
that increases the actual probabilities of hazardous events.
16.  Much of  the  literature that has followed Ehrlich and Becker (1972) has focused on the subject of adverse
selection  and moral hazard,  for example,  Marshall (1976), Hirschleifer and Riley (1979) and Coate (1995).
'7  Barr (1998)  presents the  five basic  conditions that must obtain for private  markets to pool the  risk and
cover the  losses from a specific bad state.  These  are that the probability of the bad state occurring  be:  (i)
independent;  (ii) less than one (that the bad state cannot be a certainty);  (iii) known  or estimable (that it not
be an  uncertainty);  and that  the dangers  to private  providers  arising from  (iv) adverse  selection;  and (v)
moral hazard can be kept to a minimum.
8available.  In  this  application  old age is  not  a  bad  state, per se.18 The  bad  state that
individuals  (and  policy-makers)  are  concerned  with  is  poverty  in  old age.  This  is
characterized  by:  the  inability  to  draw  sufficient  income  from work due  to  the body's
natural deterioration - Diamond and Mirrlees'  "loss of earnings  ability"; accompanied by
greater  likelihood  of facing  "catastrophic"  health  expenses;  insufficient  accumulated
savings  or other assets to meet consumption needs; and isolation, with no other means of
support such as family, friends or tribe.
For  simplicity  (and  to  reflect  the  growing  sophistication  of the  lexicon  used  in  the
literature)  I have replaced  the terms originally used by Ehrlich and Becker,  as follows.  I
refer to  "market"  and "publicly  provided,  market-type"  insurance  as pooling;1 9 to "self
insurance",  whether mandated  by the  government or taken up voluntarily as saving; and
"self protection" as prevention.  Pooling  redistributes  consumption opportunities  toward
the bad  states  of the  world  at a  price.  Saving  redistributes  income  similarly  - cash
balances reduce fluctuations in consumption - but does not pool risks.  Prevention lowers
the probability  of the bad state.  Either saving,  prevention  or both can be pursued when
pooling is not available.  Where pooling is available decisions about the optirnal amount
of saving  to  engage  in  depend  on  the relative  cost of pooling.  Thus, the  amount  an
individual will save is a function of the price of pooling, which in turn is determined  by
the probability of the bad state occurring, and can be expressed as
s = f(,p(;r(p(p ,r))))  (1)
in which
s  : amount of saving
f  : ainount of pooling, where  qo'(;r)  > 0
or  : the (market) price of pooling, where  or = p /(1 - p) +A
r  :  amount of prevention
pe  endowed (exogenous) probability of the bad state occurring
P  : probability of the bad state occurring, where  p(pe,  r)  and p'(r) < 0
A  loading factor for market pooling, where  A'(p)  > 0
As private markets  for pooling risks (or the public pooling provider,  in the case of social
insurance)  become  more  efficient,  the  market  price  of pooling  should  become  more
18  We all  age - although  some  more than  others,  as evidenced  by significant  variation  in mortality  rates
across  gender,  race  and  income groups  (Pritchett  and Summers,  1993,  Hurd  and  McGarry,  1997,  Hurd,
McFadden  and Gan,  1998).  It  is  generally  considered  a  blessing  to  live  a  long  life,  and  advances  in
technology and healthcare have brought longevity to a greater share of the population.
19  This  terminology  partly  reflects  evolution  in  the  literature  since the  Ehrlich  & Becker  paper,  and  is
preferred  since,  as  discussed,  not  all  risk  pooling  arrangements  are  market  based  or provided  by  the
government.
9responsive to changes in the probability of the bad state occurring.  A lower probability
of the bad state is translated into a lower market price for pooling.2 21
Since every dollar spent on prevention lowers the probability of the bad state, prevention
and pooling  are  compliments,  and  moral  hazard  is  not  an  inevitable  result  of pooling
becoming  available.  However,  unlike  the market  price  of pooling,  the  shadow  cost of
saving  does  not  fall  with  lower  probability  of the  bad  state.  Therefore,  as  pooling
becomes  cheaper  relative to saving,  individuals have greater  incentive to pool.  Pooling
and  saving  are  substitutes.  Every  additional  dollar  spent on  prevention  increases  the
incentives  to pool while lowering the incentives to  save.  Thus the partial derivatives  of
(1) are
asl/ar<O,  asla/)<O, a/plair>O,  a'r/ap<O, 8plar<O.
If the bad state is described  as poverty  stemming from the loss of earnings  ability in old
age,  as life-expectancy  increases  with improvements  in health  care, the probability that
most people will face a period of life in which they will need to consume  but be unable to
work also rises. 22  This is to say that the endowed component of the probability of the bad
state pe  can  rise,  raising p,  and  increasing  the  share  of the  population  that  faces  a
relatively  predictable  loss  from  disability.  Furthermore,  as  longevity  increases  (or
inversely,  as mortality  falls),  the incidence of old age not only becomes  more frequent,
but  the span of the expected  period  between the  loss  of earnings  ability and death  can
increase.  As  p  rises and a  period of life  without the ability  to  earn income  becomes
more  likely,  the  model  predicts  that  rational  individuals  should  increasingly  turn  to
savings to mitigate the risk of poverty  in old age,  and/or engage  in prevention to lower
the  likelihood of the bad  state occurring.  That is, individuals  will have  an incentive to
increase  s  but also to spend more on  r  in order to lower p at the margin.
20  Gill  and  Ilahi  (2000)  cite  the  example  of premia  for private  automobile  accident  insurance  that are
typically higher for certain groups of drivers that the market considers  more risky - men under twenty-five
- and lower for those the market considers  less risky - senior citizens.  In the case of public, market-type
pooling,  in the United States the premia employers pay for unemployment insurance  is risk-rated, according
to industry.  Industries characterized  by frequent turnover pay higher premia than those were workers loose
their job less frequently.  A  public providers'  ability to adjust  contributions  to social insurance  increases
with administrative capacity.
21  The premia for insurance policies are never strictly "actuarially" fair, as shown  in framework by the term
2,  the  loading  factor that covers  the administration costs and  profit of the private  provider of insurance.
"If  2  were independent  of p, so also would be the real price of insurance and p would have  no effect  on
the  incentive  to  insure...  Since  apparently  rare  losses  are  more  frequently  insured,  2  is  presumably
positively related to p, perhaps because processing and investigating  costs increase  as p increases."  Ehrlich
and  Becker  1972,  p.  633.  This discussion  is concerned  with a old-age  income  security  system  with a
market-type,  public pooling  component,  where  2  does not vary  across the  covered population.  For this
reason, I omit the term from the proceeding discussion.
22 However, the same advances in technology and health that increase  longevity, may also postpone the loss
of earnings  ability.  If workers  are  able  to  work  longer,  the  period  of life  before  death  that  has  to  be
financed when eamings from labor are no longer an option, may not increase, and may even shorten.
10However,  the  predicted  complementary  relationship  between  prevention  and  pooling
depends on the formal  pooling institution (private insurer or the public pooling provider)
having  information  on  the  individual  with  which  to  correctly  set the  price of pooling.
The  formal  pooling institution  must be  able  to observe  the  individual's  expenditure  on
prevention  to  correctly  price  pooling.  Formal  pooling  institutions  can  suffer  from
asymmetric  information  and  the  steps  agents  take  to  prevent  and  thus  lower  the
probability of the bad state are often unobserved.23 Where markets do not price pooling
efficiently or at all, agents may prefer to pool informally.  The savings function  (1)  must
then  be altered to  include  both  formal  (subscript F) and informal  (subscript  S)  pooling
instruments.
SF  =  fPF  (OF  (p(pe, r))),  q-S (;rS ( p(P  , r))))  (2)
Informal  pooling  arrangements  tend  to  exist  within  (relatively)  small  social  networks
(Genicot  and  Ray,  2000,  Fafchamps  and  Lund,  2000).  They  generally  have  better
information and mechanisms  to monitor the actions of participants  in the pool,  and can
overcome  information  asymmetries  with greater  ease.  If subscript  o denotes  preventive
actions taken by individuals that are observed by the formal pooling institution as well as
the observable component of the probability of the bad state;  and subscript u denotes the
preventive actions and the probability that are unobserved by the formal pooling provider,
but  monitored  by  members  of an  informal  pool,  then the  savings  function  (2)  can  be
further augmented to
SF  = f(  (7rF (PF (Po',  ro))),PS  ( 0 rS  (PS(Pog  Ip  r. , ro))))  (3)
Where  formal pooling  institutions  are subject to  information  asymmetries  and so  fail to
respond to the  preventive  measures  taken by individuals  to lower  the probability  of the
bad state occurring,  informal pooling arrangements may respond with greater efficiency
and individuals may substitute formal pooling with informal pooling to mitigate losses.
Just  as  individuals  may  look  beyond  formal  market  or  market-type  arrangements  for
pooling  instruments,  informal  savings  may  also  be  available  and preferred  to  formal
savings instruments.  Augmenting (3)  to capture informal savings instruments gives
SF = f ((F  (1rF (PF  (PO ,  rO ))), VS  (Yr  (PS (Pe Xr  ,  r0 ))), SS)  (4)
Table 2 presents the instruments that are typically available to individuals and households
to  mitigate  poverty  in  old  age,  categorized  by  instrument  type  (pooling,  saving,  and
prevention); whether  these  are  publicly  or  privately  provided;  and  their  degree  of
"formality" - that is whether the  instrument is available  through  a formal  transaction,  or
through social networks (family, inter- or intra-households).
23  Similarly,  governments  are  not  immune to the information  problems  particular to  insurance - adverse
selection  and  moral  hazard  - which  can  lead to abuse  and  mounting  fiscal  pressure  on  social  insurance
institutions.  Social  insurance  attempts  to overcome  moral hazard  and  adverse  selection  by mandate,  i.e.
forcing the "good risk" to pool with the "bad risks".The most commonly  occurring  public intervention to mitigate  poverty in old age can be
classified  as  a  5pooling  instrument  - defined  benefit,  PAYGO  social  security
arrangements.  2  Further  interventions  that  qualify  as  pooling  are  inflation  indexed
securities  that can  be held and  traded by private  pension fund  managers  and insurance
companies,  similarly  indexed  public-pension  guarantees  conditioned  on  minimum
contributions,  social  assistance  benefits  to  the elderly  indigent26,  and deposit  insurance.
Reforms  to  social  security  in  Latin  America  introduced  a  formal,  public  saving
instrument - mandated retirement accounts.  Among the public interventions categorized
as prevention in this  context,  are  prudent  macroeconomic  policies  and  sound  financial
regulation  that  can  lower  the  probability  of future  shocks,  as  well  as  mandates  that
individuals build and maintain certain minimum levels of human capital through publicly
provided (or subsidized) education and health that postpone the loss of earnings ability by
increasing the length of working life.
Individuals  and households  in most circumstances pool, save and prevent against poverty
in old age on their own.  Where the necessary conditions obtain, all three  actions can be
taken formally through private markets.  Individuals  can purchase  private annuities or life
insurance  policies (pooling).  They can deposit savings in private bank accounts  or invest
in  property  (saving).  Additionally,  they  can  build  th--ir  human  capital  beyond  the
minimum required  by government,  as well  as extend their earning  capacity  into old-age
by  purchasing  tools  and  equipment  with  which  to  start  small  household  enterprises
(prevention).
Similarly,  all  three  options  are  often  taken  informally.  Households  send  and  receive
transfers to smooth consumption; take  in elderly relatives  and other extended family that
may be recovering  from an adverse shock to income; and have large families or invest in
their  children's  education  with  the  expectation  of  reciprocity  between  generations
(pooling).  Further,  individuals  may choose to accumulate  deposits in their homes rather
24  Applying  the  framework  at  the  aggregate  level,  pooling  risk  (with  market-type  old-age  insurance,
financed on a PAYGO basis) will become more expensive relative to individual saving as the probability of
long-life  increases  and  the "frequency"  of old  age  (relative  to working  age)  in  the population  increases.
The  legally set, minimum retirement  age  keeps the age at which workers declare "loss of earnings ability"
constant.  Thus, while advances  in healthcare  can postpone  the "loss of earnings ability",  in most countries
a legal retirement age  that fails to adjust to demographic  changes extends  the period before death that must
be financed.  The need to raise pay-roll taxes to finance  PAYGO social  security systems in countries with
"aging"  populations,  and transfers  from general  revenues  to pay  public pensions  where  contributions  fall
short,  are  strong  indications  of the  increasing  relative  cost  of pure-pooling  arrangements.  The growing
preference  for defined  contribution plans among employer-provided  pension schemes  around the world, is
further evidence  of the  increasing relative  costs of pooling  for old age  income  security  as  life expectancy
increases.
25 Again at the aggregate  level, rising pay-roll taxes needed to finance  PAYGO benefits, increase  the cost of
pooling  relative to  saving outside the  system,  and may drive workers  into  informal employment.  In time
the burden of pay-roll taxes can even  increase political  support for a partial or total transition to individual
accounts.
26  Since social assistance  benefits that are targeted to the elderly  are financed out of general revenue  from
taxation  - in  Chile,  primarily  from  the  value  added  tax  on  consumption  - they  can  be  categorized  as
country-level pooling, by which all tax-payers are members of the pool.
12than  in  a  bank,  or  lend  money  to  family  and  friends  at  interest  (saving).  Finally,
individuals can increase  their health and delay their loss of earnings ability through good
diet and regular exercise (prevention).  However, that individuals  and households can and
often do pool, save and prevent - formally and informally  - without the aid of government
intervention,  does not necessarily suggest that they  are fully or even effectively  covered
against the risk of poverty in old age.  .
IV. Hypotheses
Several  insights  can  be  drawn  from  the  Ehrlich  and  Becker  framework  and  formally
stated  as testable  hypotheses.  However,  first  additional  arguments  should be added to
(4).  An individual's bounded rationality will drive a wedge between the objective  and the
perceived  benefits of mitigating  the risk of poverty  in old age in the formal  system.  If
there is an elderly  member of the household receiving a pension,  this might demonstrate
to  the  individual  the  potential  benefits  from contribution.27 Further,  it  is important  to
account for factors limiting access to formal saving, found to be significant in the analysis
of contributions  to social security in Packard,  Shinkai and Fuentes  (2001).  These factors
can include industry of employment; type of employment;  and characteristics  of the work
place.  If a  captures  factors  determining  access,  and  0  the perceived  benefits  derived
from contributing to the formal system, then
SF  = f  (a,  pF  ('C  (PF (PO  ,  rO ))), (PS (;r  (PS (Pe  Xr  rO ))), SS  O)  (5)
If pooling  and saving  are substitutes,  as predicted by Ehrlich  and Becker,  an increase in
the  relative  price  of pooling  with  the  rising  probability  of old  age  should  increase
individual demand for saving.  However, the framework also predicts that as the endowed
probability  of old  age  increases,  individuals  will  have  an  incentive  to prevent  the bad
state  by taking  actions  that delay their  loss of eamings  ability.  Since  individuals  will
prefer pooling to saving to mitigate losses that are rare,  greater expenditure  on prevention
should lower the preferred amount of saving and increase the preferred amount of pooling
at the margin.
The market (or public pooling provider) only takes account of the probability of the bad
state that is observed - in this context,  mean life expectancy.  To the extent that certain
groups  in the population  do not  enjoy  increasing  life expectancy  relative  to the mean -
workers who engage  in risky activities, those who  come from families with a history of
poor  health,  the  life-time  poor  and  certain  minorities  - saving  may  be  relatively
expensive, and pooling to insure  against what still may be a relatively rare  incidence of
"old  age",  may  be  the  preferred  instrument.  Where  PAYGO  systems  have  been
eliminated entirely  in favor of individual  accounts,  or if the price  of the formal pooling
option does not take the lower probability  of the bad state  into account,  it may be more
27  Thaler (1994) argues that in the context of saving for retirement the multi-period  dynamic maximization
problem posed  in the  life-cycle literature,  is complex,  there is no chance for learning,  and few simple rules
of thumb  to  follow  to  get  it  right,  but  the  example  of previous  generations  can  provide  examples  for
younger generations to follow.
13efficient  for these  groups  to  turn  away  from the  formal  system  altogether,  in  favor  of
informal pooling mechanisms.28
The hypotheses to be tested in the sections that follow are formally presented below.  The
term  SF and  opF  denote saving and pooling within the formal retirement security system;
Ss  and  ops  refer to saving and pooling outside of the system;29
Ceteris paribus...  Null  Alternative
1. Structural  factors  do not limit access  to  saving  HO  85F I aa = 0  Hi  8 SF / aa <  0
and pooling in the formal  system.
HO:  a9pF /  aa  O  Hi:  aoF  I aa < 0
2.  A  rise  in  the  probability  (observable  and  H  asF /  = 0  Hi  asF  IAPO > °
unobservable)  of  old-age  does  not  increase  the  0
incentives  to save in the formal system.  Ho:  asF  apO.  HI:  aSF Ia  >OU  >
3.  Greater  unobserved  prevention  (which  lowers  Ho  aSFI  or. = 0  HI  aSF / 8 ru  < 0
the  relative  cost  of pooling),  does  not  lower  the
incentives  to save in the formal system.
4.  Formal  pension  benefits  received  by  elderly  HO  aSF /a  = 0  Hi  aSF I/0  > 0
household  members do not increase  the likelihood
that individuals save  in the formal system.
5. Individuals do not substitute pooling and saving  HO  aqF I/  aPS = 0  Hi  aDPF I  a(PS  < 0
in  the  formal  system  with  analogous  (informal)
risk-mitigating behavior outside the system.  HO  aSF / ass = 0  Hi  aSF l ass <0
The  combined  saving and pooling  character of the formal  retirement  security  system  in
Chile  can also  be accommodated  within the  set of testable hypotheses.  As explained  in
Section  II,  workers  who  have  contributed  to  the  system  for  240  months  (20  years)
become eligible for a minimum pension guaranteed by the government.  Contributions up
to  the  240-month  eligibility  threshold  may  be  motivated  purely  or  primarily  by  a
preference  for pooling.  Further  contributions to the  system beyond the threshold  (other
than  the  portion  that  pays  AFP  commissions  and  the  premia  for  disability  and  life
insurance)  are primarily savings.30
28  While  individuals'  increased  expenditure  on  prevention  may  not  be  observed  by  formal  pooling
providers  (public an  private), they  are likely to be observed  by members  of an  informal  pool - neighbors,
family members,  etc..
29  In  Table  2  pooling  and  saving (and  prevention)  instruments,  other  than  those  provided  publicly,  are
categorized separately  as  "formal"  (i.e.  market-based)  and  "informal"  (i.e.  non-market  based).  Since this
research  is  mainly  concerned  with  individuals'  take  up  of  the  publicly  provided  instruments  when
alternatives  are  available,  I have  chosen  to economize  on  notation  by  bundling  market  and non-market
saving,  as well as market and non-market  pooling, into a single set of private alternative  instruments to the
retirement  security system.
30 Readers will recall that only  10 percentage points of workers'  contributions accumulate as savings, while
3 percentage  points  pay the  fund  managers'  commissions  and the premia  for  private  disability  and  life
insurance policies.
14Thus  a  different  set  of  incentives  prevails  once  affiliates  become  eligible  for  the
minimum  guaranteed  annuity.  If  additional  contributions  to  the  pension  system  are
simply  savings,  and  alternative,  perhaps  cheaper,  more  flexible  forms  of saving  (both
market  and  non-market  based)  are  available,  individuals  may  prefer  to  diversify  their
retirement  portfolios  by  saving  outside  the  system  once  they  have  secured  the  formal
pooled  benefit.  Admittedly,  additional  contributions  beyond  the  minimum  eligibility
threshold  are  not  purely  savings,  since  affiliates  are  still  purchasing  pooled  coverage
against  disability  and  death.  However,  market  based  and  non-market  based  pooling
instruments to cover death and disability may also be available, and may offer individuals
a greater degree of choice as to just how much protection against these contingencies they
would  like  to purchase.31  If a sufficient  number  of alternative  market and  non-market
instruments to save and insure were available,  additional contributions to the government
mandated system might be redundant.
If c denotes  an individuals'  contribution  history  (in months),  another hypothesis can be
added to take account of the different set of incentives that prevail once affiliates become
eligible for the minimum pooled benefit guaranteed by the government.
Ceteris paribus...  Null  Alternative
6.  Individuals  do not reduce  their contributions  to  Ho *  sF /ass = 0  H  *  sF /lss  <  0
the  formal  system  in  favor  of alternative  saving
once the formal pooled benefit has been secured.  for affiliates whose  for affiliates whose
c 2 240  months  c > 240  months
V. The Data
Analysis of participation in the  reformed  social  security system  in Chile has  been,  until
now,  constrained  by  the  limitations  of  the  CASEN  survey.  Several  previously
unavailable  variables were constructed  for this analysis from data collected  in a risk and
social  insurance  survey  (in  Spanish,  Encuesta de  Previsi6n de  Riesgos  Sociales -
PRIESO)  conducted  in  Santiago,  Chile  in  December  1999  and  January  2000.  The
PRIESO  was  specifically  designed  to  identify  the  strategies  taken  by  individuals  and
households  to  mitigate  a series  of risks  to  income.  In addition  to traditional  questions
31  Banks  and  insurance  companies  in Chile  offer  a growing  selection  of savings  and insurance  products.
Term  life  insurance  policies  (seguro de  vida con ahorro), available  since  1995,  may  be  a  competitive
alternative  insurance  and  investment  instrument  to the  pension  system.  Private  insurance  companies  in
Chile  report that,  while  it is likely that the  prices of these policies  are prohibitive  for poorer households,
there  is considerable  demand  for these  life  insurance/savings  facilities  among  middle-  and  lower-income
groups  - especially  younger  age  cohorts  for  whom  premiums  are  low.  Santander (a private  insurance
provider)  offers a policy (Super Futuro), which guarantees  a market rate of return on the  savings  portion
that will  not fall below UF+4%.  Policy holders  can  insure up  to a certain  amount  in benefits in  case of
death without  having to undergo medical  examination.  Partial withdrawals  can be made from the  savings
account after three years of paying premia.  At the legal age of retirement,  the policy holder can withdrawal
the  full  balance  of his  savings.  Although  premia  are  taxed,  the  returns  to  the  savings  account  and
withdrawals  are tax exempt.  In a casual  poll of taxi drivers in Santiago, term  life insurance  policies were
frequently mentioned  as alternatives to an AFP retirement account.
15dealing with household composition,  income and labor market activity, the  survey asked
for  respondents'  opinions  of  the  reformed  pension  system,  their  preferences  for
alternative  retirement  security  strategies,  their access to  credit, Berceptions  of their own
mortality,  income  shocks and contingent  risk-coping  strategies.  A list of the variables
constructed  from the PRIESO for the present analysis and their definition, is provided  in
Table  3 (in alphabetical  order).  In Table 4, I have categorized  those variables  related to
demand  for cover under the current system by their instrument-type:  fornal and informal
pooling, saving, and prevention.33 Variables controlling for factors affecting individuals'
access  to  the pension  system  - discussed  in  Packard,  et  al  (2001)-  are  shown  in  the
shaded column of Table 4.
Among the  sample of workers in Santiago who are affiliated to the pension  system, only
62% were making contributions  at the time of the  survey, approximately  the  same  level
as found  by  Edwards  and  Edwards  (2000)  in  1998.  Among  working  men,  64%  were
contributing.  Only 58% of working women made contributions,  while among women of
working age who were neither working nor searching for a job, 42% received some cover
from  the  system  through  the  contributions  of a  spouse,  leaving  58%  without  formal
coverage.  However,  contribution to the system at any point in time can underestimate the
share of workers  who  are actually covered,  in that the measure does not take account of
past  contributions  nor of disability  and  life  insurance  benefits  that extend  for  a period
after a worker has stopped contributing.
In an analysis of the coverage of an old-age  income security system - especially demand
for cover  - the  only  choice  variable  is  an  individual's  period  of contributions  to  the
system  as  a  share  of their working  lives  - their  "contribution density" (CONDEN  in
Table  3).  This measure  has  long been unavailable  to researchers  in Chile  and in other
developing  countries.34 35  Respondents  to  the  PRIESO  were  asked  the month  and year
32  Details  on  the  sampling  techniques  used,  as  well  as  excerpts  from  the  field  report  are  provided  in
Appendix One.  The full questionnaire is  reproduced  in English as Appendix Two.
33  Readers  will  note  that  there  are  few  if any  available  variables  included  to  act  as proxies  for formal
pooling  outside  the  pension  system,  informal  saving  and  informal  prevention.  While  there are  several
questions  in the  PRIESO  questionnaire  (see  Appendix  Two) to elicit data on these  instruments,  variables
constructed  from these data were excluded  from the empirical  analysis mainly because there were too few
observations.  There  is  also no proxy  for  p0 , the probability of the  bad state that is observed.  Although,
objective  life expectancy  could act as an acceptable  proxy, this is a function  of age,  making it difficult  to
unravel  the  effects  on  contribution  of the  observable  probability  of poverty  from  the  effects  of age.
Furthermore,  due  to an element  of ambiguity  about what  is purely saving  and what  is purely  prevention,
inherited  from the  Ehrlich and Becker  framework  (see  quote in  footnote  12),  it is difficult  to definitively
categorize  variables  such as years of education (with  both "prevention"  and "access"  elements).  I discuss
how this ambiguity is  reflected  in the interpretation of the results in the next section.
34  Ironically,  while  a worker's  density  of contributions  is relatively more  important  in assessing  whether
they  are  covered  in  a defined  contribution  system  than  under  a purely PAYGO  regime,  the  private  and
decentralized  structure of the reformed  system  in Chile  has made  data on contribution  history unavailable
to the system's regulators.  Only recently have  the authorities  made an  official request to  the private fund
managers  for the  contribution  history  of a  sample  of affiliates  in  order to  begin  assessing  whether  the
system will provide adequate retirement benefits.
16that they first contributed to the social  security system.  They were then asked to estimate
the total period in years and  months they had failed to contribute  for whatever reason -
inactivity, unemployment,  employment without a contract,  self employment  - since they
started. I constructed the variable "contribution density" by first calculating  respondents'
history of contributions  in  months,  and dividing this  by their number  of months  in the
labor force, using Mincer's  (1974) formula for labor market experience:  (age  - years of
education  - five).
In  Figure  2,  the  sample  of affiliated  men  and  women  is  divided  into deciles  by  their
contribution  density.  Taking  eligibility  for  the  minimum  pension  guaranteed  by  the
government as a measure of minimum level of coverage  offered under the (contributory)
old  age  income  security  system,  I  divided the required  months  of contribution  for the
guaranteed  benefit (240,  or 20 years) by the average number of working months for men
and women.  The  resulting  share  is  the "contribution  density  threshold"  that affiliates
must cross  to qualify  for the  minimum  pension  guarantee  (the bold,  horizontal  axis  in
each  graph).  Assuming  that workers  will maintain their reported rate  of contribution to
the  system,  affiliates  whose  contribution  density  places  them  above  the threshold  will
qualify  for  (at  least)  the  minimum  level  of  cover,  while  those  below  will  not.  It  is
immediately apparent that a larger share of affiliated women - about half - lies below the
threshold of contributions necessary to be covered.  However,  many of these women may
be entitled to some benefit through the current and past contributions of a husband.  What
is  particularly  worrying  is  that  30%  of affiliated  men  are  unlikely  to  qualify  for  the
minimum contributory benefit.
The  PRIESO  survey  includes  a wide  range  of questions  about  informal  instruments  to
mitigate  poverty  in old  age,  and how these  might substitute  or complement  the formal
pension system.  In addition to questions as to whether respondents  gave (received) help
in-kind or in cash to (from) family and friends outside the household (in Table  3,  GIVES
and GETS);  the number of children respondents had and/or intended to have (EXKIDS);
and how much they  spend on their children's education  every month (LEDKIDS);  two
questions were posed to capture whether  parents  expected their children  to care for them
in their old age and in what way.36 The responses to these questions are tabulated by the
number of children reported by the respondent, and presented separately  for those living
in urban and rural  areas in Tables 5 and 6.  Readers  will note that these questions  were
posed even to individuals who did not have children at the time of the survey.
35  Cox-Edwards  (2000)  uses  cross-section  survey  data  to  estimate  longitudinal  patterns  of contributory
behavior  and  wages.  Because  information  on years  of contributions  were  previously  unavailable,  Cox-
Edwards  is forced  to  create  synthetic  cohorts  to  estimate  years  of contributions.  She  finds  that  men
typically accumulate  forty years worth of contributions from the age of 16 - 65.  Women tend to have more
interruptions especially the ones with lower levels of education.
361 am indebted to John Hoddinott for many of the questions appearing in  this module of the PRIESO, and
to Ana Maria Arriagada  for pointing  out that Chileans'  expectations of sons were  likely to be very different
from their expectations of daughters.
17It is difficult to discern a clear pattern to reported expectations from children,  other than
the rural/urban disparities one might expect from a review of the literature.37 While 47%
of respondents from rural areas  expected to live with a son or a daughter in their old age,
only  19% of urban respondents  held  the same expectation.  Similarly, rural respondents
seem more confident  that they  would receive  some sort of care from their children,  with
670io  giving  an  affirmative  response,  and  only  14%  unsure.  Only  17%  of rural
respondents  did not expect to be cared for by their children.  Urban respondent,  on the
other hand,  were  more  evenly  distributed  between  those  that expected  care  from their
children (34%), those that did not (30%), and those that did no know (19%).  When asked
why  they  did  not  expect  either  a  son  or  daughter  to  care  for  them  (28%  of all
respondents),  the answer most frequently  given by respondents was that they did not want
to become  a burden.  The  impact  of parents'  expectations  on the  likelihood  that  they
contribute to the formal pension system is examined more closely in the next section.
Finally, respondents to the survey were asked the age at which they expected to die.  I use
their responses to construct  subjective measures  of life-expectancy  that act as a proxies
for  the  perceived  probability  of the  bad-state.38 I  constructed  the  subjective  life
expectancy  variable  (SLIFEX)  by  subtracting  the  respondents  age  at the  time of the
survey  from  their  predicted  age  of death.  Similar  studies of savings  and  retirement-
income  security  using  data from the United  States  by Hurd  and  McGarry,  (1997),  and
Hurd, McFadden &  Gan, (1998) also make extensive use of subjective life expectancy.
A  brief  analysis  of what  drives  respondents'  survival  expectations  is  illuminating.
Regressions  of the dependent variable SLIFEX on a number of explanatory variables, are
shown  separately  for men and women in Table 7.  After controlling for the average  life
expectancy  predicted  by a mortality  table for Chile,39 respondents  with more  education
expect to live longer.  Both objective and  subjective indicators of the respondent's health
- how many  cigarettes  they  smoke  in  a month  (SMOKER),40 whether  they  had  been
hospitalized  in the  last two years  (HOSP),  and  their  reported  likelihood  of falling ill
37 Alderman and Paxson, (1992), Hoddinott, (1992), Deaton, (1990 and 1997), Cox, Eser and Jimenez,
(1998)
38 A more exact proxy for the perceived  probability  of the bad state in this context would be respondents'
expected period of "retirement",  strictly defined as a the period prior to death when they are unable to earn
an  income  from  work.  The PRIESO  asked  respondents  the age  at which they thought they  would  not
longer be able to work, and an "expected  retirement"  variable can be constructed from the data.  However,
there  is  evidence  in  the  data  that  many  respondents  took  "ability  to  work"  to  refer  literally  to  their
intentions  to work outside the  household, and,  therefore,  that the phrasing of the question may have been
biased  against  inactive  women  who  never considered  the  possibility.  For this reason,  while the expected
retirement variable behaves similarly to subjective life expectancy  in the model, I prefer using the latter.
39  To  calculate  the  mean  "objective"  life  expectancy  I used  the World  Bank's Pension Reform  Options
Simulation Tool (PROST) and a life table for Chile.
401 included the continuous variable  SMOKER,  guided by Becker and Murphy (1988), Ehrlich and Chuma,
(1990),  Chaloupka (1991), and Becker and Mulligan  (1997)  who formalize  the a theoretical  link between
smoking,  myopia  and  future  expectations,  as  well  as  by  the  empirical  findings  of Fuchs  (1986)  who
explores  the relationship  between  inter-temporal  choice,  myopia,  health behavior  (smoking),  and  health
status.
18(PSICK) - significantly lower the number of years that they expected to live.  While not
statistically  significant  for  the male sample,  women  who  are  concerned  with becoming
disabled (DISAB) also expected to live a shorter  life.  Both men and women took strong
signals  about  how  long  they  should  expect  to  live  from  their  parents'  experience.
Whether a parent (of the same sex)  is alive - or if deceased,  the age at which that parent
died - has a strong, positive  effect on the subjective  life expectancy  of both sexes.  The
regressions  explain  59%  and  62%  of the  variation  among  responses  from  men  and
women,  respectively,  suggesting  that  respondents'  expectations  contain  a  substantial
rational  component.  These results are  similar to those  reported in the  studies using data
from the United States, cited above.
VI. Results
I have separated  the empirical  analysis  of individual  preferences  to mitigate  poverty in
old  age  into  two  parts.  In  the  first,  tobit  regressions  are  performed  to  show  the
determinants of reported density of contributions (CONDEN): the total number of months
respondents have  contributed to the social  security/pension  system, divided by their total
number  of economically  active  months.4 '  Since  the  dependent  variable  in  the  tobit
regressions  is constructed  from respondents'  recollections  extending  back to  when they
first  contributed  to  social  security,  there  are  few  remaining  pre-determined  variables
(other than age, education and for younger respondents assets held ten years prior to the
survey)  to  act  as  exogenous  regressors.  Thus  the  results  of  the  tobits  should  be
interpreted  with  caution.  For  this reason  probit regressions  - similar  to  those  used in
Barrientos  (1998),  Holzmann,  Packard  and Cuesta (2000),  and Packard,  et al  (2001)  to
measure the probability that a respondent is contributing  at the time of the  PRIESO,  are
used in the second part of the analysis.  Conceptually,  "contribution density" in the tobit
regressions  is  the  integral  over  the  individual's  working  life  of  the  binary
"contributes/does not contribute  " in the probits that follow.
Additionally, motivated by the results of the economic experiments discussed in Barr and
Packard  (2002), the same tobit and probit regressions  are estimated  on a sample of self
employed  men,  first  without  and  then  with  the  measures  of time  preference  and  risk
tolerance constructed  for the sub sample of PRIESO respondents  who participated in the
experiment.
(vi.a) Tobit Regressions on Contribution  Density
The  results  of the  tobit  regressions  on  contribution  density  for  men  and  women  are
presented  in  Table  8.  It  bears  repeating  that  there  are  a  limited  number  of  truly
predetermined  variables  in the  PRIESO  data  that  can  act  as  regressors  in  this  model.
Since  I have chosen  to  include  potentially  endogenous  right-hand-side  variables  in the
41  Since  only  those respondents  who  are  affiliated to  the pension system  can  report  contributions,  and  to
allow  for the possibility  that affiliated  workers,  particularly  affiliated  women  are  a self-selected  group,  I
first experimented with a Heckman  (1979) two-step procedure.  The dependent variable in the first step was
a  binary  equal  to  I if the  respondent  was  affiliated  to  the  pension  system,  and  in  the  second  step  the
dependent variable was contribution  density.  However, tests for significant correlation of the error terns in
the two regressions rejected the Heckman procedure.
19analysis, the results should be interpreted with caution.  Variables  are included to control
for  age  (AGE);  whether  the  respondent  is  head  of household  (HEAD);  or  married
(MARRIED);  their  years  of education  (YEDU);  whether  the  respondent  has  ever  been
employed  outside  the  home  (WORKED);42 whether  their  spouse  contributes  to  the
pension system (SPCONT); and whether the respondent entered the labor market prior to
Chile's pension  reform  in  1981  (PAYGREG).  Additionally, to  control for the effect of
constrained liquidity management on retirement saving I include a variable equal to one if
respondents  needed  but  were  unable  to  get  a  loan  in  the  year  prior  to  the  survey
(CREDCON).
The remaining variables  in the model are included  to capture factors  affecting  individual
and  household  demand  for  formal  cover.  Several  variables  are  included  to  examine
possible  substitution  between the  mandated  pension  system, other  pooling  and  savings
instruments  outside the system, as well as formal and informal prevention.  These  include
variables to capture inter-generational  household  pooling, proxied by expected care from
children (EXKIDS, LEDKIDS, FAMEX)  and inter household  transfers  (GIVES, GETS);
alternative  forms of savings, captured by the log of imputed rent (LRENT),  property and
financial  assets  held  in  1990  (COLATT,  FINASST);  and  variables  representing
prevention measures such as investments in machinery  and tools for household  enterprise
(WRKASST).  The respondents'  subjective  life  expectancy  (SLIFEX),  discussed  in the
previous  section,  is  included  to  capture  the  effect  on  contribution  behavior  of  the
perceived probability  of needing  to  finance  a  period  of  life  without  earning-ability.
Additionally, the  (log of) incomes  received by the household  from contributory  (LJUB)
and  non-contributory  (LPASIS)  retirement  pensions  are  included  to  examine  how  the
receipt  of different types of benefits by elderly in the household  - the benefits  of formal
pooling - might influence the behavior of the working-age  sample.
For both sexes,  a cubic polynomial  on AGE  is preferred,  showing  an initial increase  in
contribution  density  with  age  at  the  start of an  individual's  working  life,  that  flattens
midway  through,  only  to  increase  again just prior  to  retirement.  The  negative  and
significant coefficient  on AGE2 may be evidence of the competing demands of a growing
family  on discretionary  income,  or of a preference  for investing  in  home  ownership  in
early  adulthood.  Being  head  of  a  household  significantly  (10%  level)  increases
contribution  density among men,  but has no significant effect among women.  As in the
wider range  of countries  analyzed  in Packard,  et  al  (2001),  marriage  significantly  (10%
level)  reduces  women's  contributions  to  the  pension  system,  since  once entering  into
marriage,  women in Chile are still more likely to allocate  a greater  share of their time to
household production (Barrientos,  1998a, Montenegro, 2001).43
42  Cox-Edwards  (2000)  finds that  the key  determinant  of gender  differences  in contribution  behavior is
affiliation - women are less  likely to be affiliated to the system,  since they are less  likely to have worked,
and if they worked, less  likely to have  ever held a contract job.  She concludes  that the sample of women
affiliates  is  not a random sample of all women, but a sub-sample of women that have higher attachment of
the  labor force.  The  variable "WORKED"  is included to control  for unobservable  factors  that determine
whether an individual chooses to be employed in activities outside the household.
43 Several  authors have attributed the relatively low incidence of contribution  among married women to the
structure  of most pension  systems  by  which  wives  are  covered  against health,  disability  and  the  sudden
20A respondent's education has a positive and highly significant effect (at 1% level for men
and  women)  on  contribution  density.  This  may  capture  a  greater  likelihood  that
individuals  with more fornal education will enter the covered sector where the returns to
education  are  likely to  be higher than  in other  sectors.  The result may  also  point to a
greater  propensity  to  save  among  individuals  with  relatively  higher  life-time  incomes,
and relatively greater awareness  of the importance of saving for retirement.  Considering
the effect of education  on time and risk preferences  found by Barr and Packard  (2002),
the positive impact of education on contribution  density may also be evidence of greater
patience  and  understanding  of the  risks  and  returns  from  investing  in  the  pension
system.4
The negative  coefficient  on the binary  variable  PAYGREG  (significant  at  1%  level  for
men),  may  reflect  a  greater  apprehension  among  older  workers  for  the  system  of
individual  accounts  that  substantially  increases  the  portion  of retirement  income  risk
borne  by  individuals.  Conversely,  the  coefficient  could  be  capturing  the  positive
incentives  to  contribute  among  workers  who  entered  the labor market  after the Chile's
pension  reform,  found  at  the aggregate  level  in  Packard  (2001).  Among  women  the
estimated coefficient on the same variable is not significant.
The  coefficient  on  the  binary  variable  controlling  for  the  effects  of credit constraints
(CREDCON)  has a strongly  significant  (1%  level),  negative impact  on the contribution
density of both  men and women.  An  individual's  ability to borrow and thus to manage
liquidity is an important determinant of whether  they are able to invest a portion of their
discretionary  income  in a relatively  illiquid asset  from  one month  to the next  (Thaler,
1994,  James,  1999).  Constrained  credit  is  especially  relevant  to  the  savings  decisions  of
households with low  incomes and the self employed (Holzmann, et al, 2000).  Again, this result
has to be  interpreted  with caution as the variable  captures  credit constraints  only in the
twelve  months  prior  to  the  PRIESO,  and may  be  endogenous.  Excluding  the variable
from  the  regression  has  no  effect  on  the  sign  and  significance  of  the  estimated
coefficients on the remaining variables.
Only  one  of the variables  included  as  proxies  for  informal  pooling  has  a  significant
coefficient  in  the tobit  regressions  on contribution  density.  Among  men,  the  expected
number of children has a significantly  positive effect (10%  level).  This could either be
evidence  that  men  with  a  larger  number  of dependents  place  a greater  value  on the
disability  and survivor  coverage  that  is bundled  into  the AFP  system,  or of a bequest
motive  in  contributing  to  an  individual  retirement  account  (the  remaining  balance  of
which  - after  financing  survivor  annuities  - can  be  left  to  dependents  as  part  of the
death of their husbands  through the contributions of the male household head (Barrientos,  1996,  Schwarz,
1997, Cox-Edwards,  2000).  However,  the tobit regressions  indicate that whether a spouse is  contributing
or  not (SPCONT)  has no  significant effect  on the density of contribution  of either men or women in the
tobits.
44  However,  since education can also postpone loss of earnings  ability,  the framework  would also predict
that respondents  with more education  might be more  inclined to pool rather than to save.  This is  taken up
in the next  sub-section  where  the  pooling  element  of the  formal  pension  system  is separated  from  the
saving element.
21contributor's  estate).  In  a  recent  study  of household  saving  in  Chile,  Butelmann  and
Gallego  (1999) find evidence of such bequest motives.  However, the result could also be
endogenous  or  simultaneous  as  men  with  covered  jobs  could  decide  to  have  larger
families  with  greater  confidence  in their  income  security.  On the  other hand,  among
women a larger number of expected children significantly  (1%  level) lowers contribution
density.  While this may simply reflect the preference among women who expect to have
many children to stay  at home rather  than work outside  the home,  it may also  indicate
that women in Chile expect children to care for them in their old age, preferring  informal
pooling to formal retirement  security arrangements.
Turning to alternative  saving instruments, the estimated coefficient  on the log of imputed
rent  is negative  and significant  (5%  level)  to contribution  density.  Home  ownership  is
often cited as a form of retirement savings and investment  in Europe and the United Sates
(Barr,  2001,  Attanasio  and  Banks,  2001,  Case,  Quigly  and  Shiller,  2001).  In  Latin
America,  home  property  is still the  most widely  held asset  (IADB,  2000)  and  may be
considered  a  viable  alternative  to  government  organized  social  security.  The  negative
coefficient  on the  log of imputed rent  (LRENT)  may be  evidence  that investment  in a
home  acts  as  a substitute  for  contribution  to the pension  system  - one form of savings,
substituting for another.  However,  given the pension system's pooling element, the result
may also reflect the predicted preference  for savings over pooling among individuals  who
expect to live longer.  45
Among the bundles  of assets held ten years  prior to  the  survey, only the  coefficient  on
productive  and  business  assets (WRKASST:  including  tools,  machinery,  vehicles,  own
business), a market-based  prevention measure that extends earnings capacity into old age,
is  significant.  For  men the  coefficient  is  negative  and  significant  (at  1%),  while  for
women, the coefficient is positive and significant  (at 5%).  While WRKASST is likely to
be  capturing  prevention  measures  among  men,  for  women  the  variable  may  show
relatively  greater prudence  and  forethought in managing extra income  from a household
enterprise, rather than simply acting as a dummy variable  for women who have engaged
in income earnings activities.46
Subjective life  expectancy  (SLIFEX)  is included to  control for the behavioral  effects of
the  perceived  probability  of the  bad  state.  As  predicted  by  the  Ehrlich  and  Becker
framework,  among  male  respondents  life  expectancy  has  a  positive  and  strongly
significant (1%  level) influence  on how much they choose to save in the pension  system.
The greater the perceived  incidence of longevity,  the more individuals  are compelled  to
save  for income  security  in  old  age.47 However,  the  same  variable  is  not  significant
among women.
45  I  return  to the issue of housing  in the next section,  where  the  pooling element of the  formal  system is
separated from the saving element.
46The variable  WORKED  is already controlling  for whether a woman has ever worked outside the home.
47  Alternative  specifications  of the  model  in  which  a variable  measuring  expected  period of retirement
(calculated  by taking  the period between  the age  at which a respondent thought they  would no longer  be
able to earn an income from work, and the age at which they expected  to die), was also positive and highly
22The amount  of income that  the household  receives  in  contributory  pensions  also  has  a
strong positive  effect (significant at 1%  level) on the contribution density of men, but no
significant  effect on that of women.  Retirement  benefits  received  by the elderly in the
household may have a positive  learning impact on the contribution behavior of working-
age men, demonstrating  the  benefits of formal  saving  and pooling.  That the  coefficient
on  the  same  variable  for  women  is  not  significant,  comes  as  little  surprise.  Benefits
received  by  resident  elderly  women  are  likely  to  have  been  earned  through  the
contributions of a deceased.husband,  and thus, less likely to have a "leaming" impact on
the contribution behavior of younger  women.4 8 If the positive sign on LJUB is capturing
a  demonstration  effect,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  expect  a  negative  and  significant
coefficient  on  the amount  of non-contributory  old  age benefits  received  by  elderly the
household.  However,  the coefficient on log of household income  from social assistance
pensions (LPASIS) is not significantly different from zero.  This may indicate that social
assistance benefits  for old age in Chile are efficiently targeted  to the elderly poor, or set
sufficiently low as to prevent moral hazard among those of working age.
(vi.  b) The Probability  of  Contribution at  a Point  in Time
In the set of regressions  discussed in this sub-section,  I have excluded  inactive men and
women - those  without work  who  were  not  looking  for  employment  - as  well  as the
unemployed.49 Many of the variables  included in the regressions  presented  in Tables  9
and  10, are carried  over from the probits on contribution to social security,  presented  in
Packard,  et al  (2001).  These  variables  control  for factors  that might  limit individuals'
access to the pension system (labor market insertion; firm size; hours worked; industry of
employment).  The dummy controlling for access to credit (CREDCON)  is also  included
as a control for factors determining access.  Including these variables in the probits helps
ensure that the variables  constructed from the PRIESO data capture demand-side factors
only  - individuals'  portfolio  decisions  with respect  to  their  expectations  and  available
options to pool and save outside the system.
To variables  used  in the tobits discussed  above,  I have added  a larger set of household
composition  variables  (SHYKIDS,  SHKIDS,  SHOLDM,  SHOLDW,  NYFEM,
RESFAM)  to  better capture  preferences  for informal pooling;50 whether  the respondent
significant to contribution density.  A related  variable, the difference between  the objective life expectancy
as  predicted  by  Chile's  life  table  and  respondents'  expectations,  was  similarly positive  and  significant.
However, the simple subjective  life-expectancy  SLIFEX is  preferred to avoid suspected biases discussed in
an  earlier  footnote,  and  because  it is less  correlated  with  age  and  lowers  the  risk  of  biases  from
multicollinearity.
48 If anything, one might expect a significantly negative coefficient on this variable for women of working
age.
49 Including  inactive men and women  in  the  sample, along with a binary variable to capture their choice to
stay  out of the  labor market,  does  not change  the  sign of the  significant  coefficients  in either regression.
However,  as might be expected,  the  significance of several  coefficients  is increased from leaving  inactives
out of the  sample.  Since it has been  demonstrated  elsewhere  that inactive  respondents  are  significantly
different from those who entered the labor market, I prefer to exclude them.
50  These  household  composition  variables  were  not  included  in the  tobits  out  of concem  for  possible
endogeneity.
23was  contributing  to  the  pension  system  during  the  CASEN  1998  (CONT98)  twelve
months  prior  to  the  PRIESO;  and  whether  the  respondent  has  met  the  contributory
requirements  (240  months  of  contributions)  to  be  eligible  for  the  minimum  pension
guarantee  from  the government  (MPG51)  - the contributory  pension  system's remaining
pooling  element  against  the  risk  of poverty  in  old  age.52 Further,  I  have  included
contribution density (CONDEN) as a right-hand-side  variable.  CONDEN should control
for  a  host  of possibly  omitted  variables  affecting  the  decision  to  contribute  over
respondents'  working  lives,  and  CONT98  for autocorrelation  in  contributions  between
consecutive periods.
The results of the probit regressions  on the sample of men are shown in Table 9.  Those
on  the  sample  of women  in  Table  10.  Each  table  includes  two  specifications.  The
estimated coefficients in PROBIT 1 for men and women are discussed first.
After  controlling  for  age,  education,  position  in  the household,  and  factors  that  could
determine individuals'  access to the pension system,  household composition  significantly
affects the probability that men and women are contributing, albeit in very different ways.
The  share  of children  in  the  household  does  not  have  a  significant  effect  on  the
participation  of men,  however,  every  additional  child  aged  10  to  13,  significantly  (1%
level)  increases  the  likelihood  that  women  are  contributing  by  0.7%.  This  may  be
evidence  of older children taking  on household  responsibilities,  leaving  mothers  free to
enter  the  labor  market.  The  positive  significance  of the  number  of other  women  of
working age (14 - 60) in the household (NYFEM, significant at 10% level), may reflect a
similar intra-household  allocation of labor.  The estimated  coefficients on these variables
may,  therefore,  be  capturing  yet  another  factor  determining  access  rather  than  a
preference for informal pooling arrangements.
The share of elderly men in the household  increases  the likelihood  that men of working
age  contribute  (by  0.07%),  while  the  share  of elderly  women  lowers  the  likelihood  of
contribution  (by  0.4%).  Neither  variable  is  significant  in  the  sample  of women.  The
positive impact of resident elderly men may be related to the  learning effect captured by
income from contributory pension  benefits  discussed in the previous  section - as might
the  share  of elderly  women,  in that  this may  be  evidence  of traditional,  family  based
pooling  arrangements  that  differ  according  to  gender.  However,  in  the  probit,  the
estimated  coefficient  on the contributory pension variable  LJUB is negative.  Removing
the  share of elderly men and women  one  at a time  from the probit does not change  the
sign or significance of LJUB.  Given the strong positive significance  of LJUB in the tobit
" The MPG variable is a binary that equals  I if the respondents reported months of contributions  are equal
to or greater than 240.  This is different from the "threshold" ratio discussed in the previous section, where
it was assumed that a respondent would qualify for the minimum benefit if they maintained the same rate of
contributions  for the remainder of their working lives.
52  It is worth pointing  out again, that two government-organized  pooling devices to  insure against  poverty
among the elderly remain in Chile after the  1981 reform:  the minimum pension guarantee,  conditional  on
contributions, and the means tested PASIS.
24regression  on contribution  density,  the  negative  coefficient  on the same  variable  in the
probit may indicate multicollinearity  arising from including CONDEN as a regressor.
Resident  extended  family  in  the  household  lower  the  likelihood  that  women  are
contributing  by 48%.  Again,  while  this  may simply  reflect  the need  for women  with
more dependents to stay at home rather than work outside the home, it may also indicate,
that women in Chile still count on informal  (reciprocal)  pooling arrangements for care in
their old age.
Unlike in the tobits, the number of children men expect to have, has no significant effect
on whether they contribute.  However,  men who expect to live with their children or who
otherwise expect to be cared for in their old age are significantly  (5%  level)  less likely to
contribute to the pension system.  Expecting care from children lowers the likelihood that
a male respondent is contributing by 8%.  Expecting care from children has no significant
effect on the likelihood that women contribute.
Market-based alternatives to the formal  pension system, are  less significant in the probit
than in the tobit regressions on contribution density.  While the sign on the log of imputed
rent  is still negative in the probit  it is not statistically  significant.  Holding  property  in
1990 increases the likelihood that men contribute, but this may simply reflect the effect of
higher  incomes.  None  of the  variables  for market  based  instruments  were  significant
among women.53
After  controlling  for autocorrelation  in contributions  between consecutive  periods  (with
the variable indicating whether individuals contributed at the time of the CASEN in 1998,
CONT98),  greater contribution  density (CONDEN)  strongly increases the likelihood that
both  male  and  female  respondents  are  still  contributing.  Every  additional  percentage
point iricrease  in contribution density,  increases  the likelihood that men are contributing
by 42%, and that women are contributing by 81%.  The strong, positive effect of a greater
density  of  contributions,  provides  evidence  of  positive  duration  dependence  in
contributing  behavior.  Thaler  (1994) cites  evidence  from the United  States  of similar
duration  dependence  in  retirement  savings  - once  people  in the  U.S.  start  depositing
money into a voluntary individual retirement account,  they are more likely to continue to
do  so.  However,  as widely hypothesized  in the literature  (Vittas,  1996,  Schwarz,  1998,
Cox-Edwards,  2000,  Arenas  de  Mesa,  2001)  men  who  have  met  the  contribution
threshold  to  qualify  for  the  minimum  pension  guarantee  from  the  government,  are
significantly  (5%  level)  less likely to  still contribute.  Crossing the eligibility  threshold
lowers the likelihood that men make further contributions by 13%.
Since  workers  who  reach  the age  of 55  and  have  accumulated  a balance  sufficient  to
purchase  a private  annuity  equal  to  110%  the  minimum  guarantee  are  exempted  from
contributing  further, I re-ran the regressions  on progressively smaller samples of younger
workers.  The  estimated  coefficient  on MPG  remains  negative and  significant until the
sample  is  restricted  to  respondents  under  40  years  of age.  As  the  sample  becomes
53  The  variable  controlling  for  financial  assets  was  dropped  from  the model  for predicting  contribution
perfectly  among  the  sample  of women  - respondents  may  have  declared  their  individual  account  as  a
financial asset.
25younger, the  coefficient  on one of the informal  pooling variables - monthly expenditure
on children's education (LEDKIDS) - becomes negative and significant to the probability
of contribution.  Since  contributions  up to  the MPG  threshold  may  be motivated  by a
preference for pooling,  this may be evidence of younger workers  substituting the pooling
component of the formal pension system with informal pooling.
In the second probit (PROBIT 2),  I separate  the Chilean system's pooling  element  from
its  saving  element  by  interacting  each  regressor  with  the  dummy  variable  MPG  (the
binary variable equal to  1 if the respondent had contributed  to the system  for at least 240
months),  to  capture  the  different  set  of incentives  that  obtain  once  affiliates  become
eligible  for  the  pooled  annuity  guaranteed  by  the  government.  The  only  interacted
variable that was not dropped  during a general to  specific  procedure was the interaction
of MPG  with the  log  of imputed  household  rent  (LRENT).  Including  the  interacted
variable  influences  the  significance  of other  variables  in  the  model.  The  estimated
coefficient  on firm size (FSIZE)  in the regression  on the  male sample that was negative
and significant (10% level) in the first probit, is no longer significant.  The coefficient  on
(log of) monthly expenditure on children's education (LEDKIDS) that was not significant
on  the  full  sample  of men  in  the  first  probit,  significantly  (10%  level)  lowers  the
likelihood men are contributing to the pension system in the second.
In the regressions on the sample of women, including the interacted term also changes the
results.  Female  heads  of  household  are  significantly  (10%  level)  more  likely  to
contribute in the second specification.  However,  women in rural areas and those working
in the agriculture  industry are  significantly  (both at  10%  level)  less likely  to contribute.
Like men, women who cross the eligibility threshold for the minimum pension guarantee
are 46% less likely to continue contributing to the pension system.
The estimated coefficients  on the interactions of MPG and LRENT in the model for men
and  women  are  very  revealing.  For  men,  the  likelihood  of  making  additional
contributions  beyond the minimum required  for the guaranteed  annuity,  is  significantly
(1%  level)  lower the  greater the rental  value  of their home.  Since contributions  to the
system beyond 240 months are mainly a form of saving, men who cross the threshold and
become  eligible  for the  pooled  benefit  may  prefer  to  substitute  saving  in the  pension
system with saving outside the  system in the form of housing.  The negative coefficient
on the  interacted  variable  becomes  statistically  significant  for  samples of working men
aged 49 and older.  The opposite is true for women,  although the result is less significant
(10%  level).  The greater the rental  value of the homes of women who have crossed the
contribution  threshold  for  the  minimum  benefit,  the  more  likely  they  are  to  make
additional contributions.  Since the coefficient on MPG in the same regression is negative
and  significant  (10%  level),  it  is  likely  that the  coefficient  on  the  interacted  term  is
capturing the positive effect of income.
Even after controlling  for "access"  (industry  of employment)  found to be  significant  in
Packard,  et  al  (2001),  the  variables  capturing  "demand"  (expectations,  alternative
investments,  and  portfolio  choices)  have  a  significant  impact  on  whether  workers
contribute.  In fact, including the wider range of "demand" variables constructed from the
PRIESO  data  leaves  most  of  the  "access"  variables  that  were  significant  in  the
contribution  probits  in  Packard,  et al  (2001),  statistically  insignificant.  This said,  full-
26time  workers  and  those  that work  in larger  firms  are more  likely to  contribute,  raising
concern  for workers  employed  on a part-time  basis  and those  employed  in small  firms.
There  also appear to be  barriers preventing  women  in rural  areas and those  working  in
agriculture from formal  cover.
A brief discussion  of possible  biases due to endogeneity  is warranted  before proceeding
to  the  last  sub-section  of results.  Several  of  the  variables  in  the  probit  could  be
simultaneously determined  with  contribution to the pension system  or endogenous.  The
possible  offending  variables  include  the  binary  variables  for  self  employment  and
employment  without  a  contract  (SELF,  and  INFW);54 the  controls  for  industry  of
employment;  and the binary variable capturing  credit constraint (CREDCON).  Although
I  attempted to control  for endogeneity  using  a two-stage-least-squares  procedure,  there
were an insufficient number of variables  in the PRIESO cross-section with the necessary
explanatory power to act as instruments.
Thus,  to  control  for possible  biases  from  endogeneity,  I re-ran the  probits  without the
suspect variables.  Removing the possibly endogenous  variables  did not effect the signs
or significance of the main results.  The coefficients  on some of the variables - notably
CONT98,  CONDEN,  and  MPG  - became  more  significant.  However,  removing  the
dummies  SELF  and  INFW  causes  the  estimated  coefficient  on  years  of education
(YEDU) that was positive and significant  in the tobit on contribution density, to become
significantly  (1%  level)  negative.  While  this  seemingly  contradictory  result  could  be
explained within the Ehrlich  and Becker framework,55 given the relatively  free  access to
the pension  system  enjoyed  by  workers  in  the  informal  sector,  the result  most  likely
reflects  a bias from  omitting  SELF  and  INFW.  For this  reason,  I prefer  to keep  the
variables in the model.
(vi.c) Examining  the Choices of the Self employed
Evidence from the economic experiments presented in Barr and Packard (2002), indicates
that the self employed in Chile are relatively  free to reveal their preferences  with respect.
to  the  pension  system.  Further,  the  results  of the  experiments  suggest  that  the  self
employed  are not  significantly different from wage  and salaried employees  with respect
to- time  and risk  preferences56 - both important  determinants  of savings  and  insurance
decisions.  This being the case, the self employed become an agent group of considerable
interest,  since  it is they that are most free to reveal  their preferences  while representing
the preferences  of the working  population.  Barr  and  Packard  (2002)  find that the  self
54  While it is true that  a movement  into self employment  or employment  without  a contract  substantially
lowers  the  likelihood  of contribution,  self employment  and  informal  employment  are  not  exclusionary
conditions,  per se.  As explained in  Section  11, entrepreneurs  can contribute if they choose to, and workers
without a contract can choose whether or not to be covered by posing as self employed  and contributing on
the  legal  minimum  wage.  Among  self employed  men and women  in  the PRIESO  sample,  17.5%  were
contributing to the pension system, while among employees without a contract  17.7% made contributions.
55 An  investment in education  can postpone the  loss of earnings ability,  lower the probability of poverty  in
old age, and thus, lead to a preference  for pooling.
56 While these findings are robust, they should be taken  with caution given the small sample size in the risk
aversion and time preference measurement  follow up to the PRIESO.
27employed  who choose to contribute  to the pension system are significantly more patient,
however,  contrary  to  expectations,  those  who  contribute  are also  more  tolerant of risk.
These  findings motivate a separate  set of regressions on the  sample of self employed, in
particular to see whether the time and risk preference  variables  remain significant after a
wider selection of "demand" variables from the PRIESO are included in the analysis.
Of the  186  self employed  men of working  age  in the PRIESO  sample,  40 (22%)  were
contributing  to the  pension  system.  A tobit regression  on  contribution density  for  the
sample of self employed  men, presented  in Table  11,  roughly  mirrors the results  of the
regressions  in Table 8 on the entire male sample.57 After controlling for age and position
in  the  household,  education  has  a  positive  and  significant  (5%  level)  effect  on
contribution  density.  As  in  the  earlier  regressions,  self  employed  respondents  who
entered  the  labor  market  prior to  the  1981  reform  have  significantly  (5%  level)  lower
density of contributions.  Those who  sought credit in the previous year but failed to get a
loan  also  had  significantly  (5%  level)  lower  contribution  densities.58 The  amount  of
money  received  by  the  household  in  contributory  retirement  benefits  increases
contribution  density.  As  in  the  earlier  tobit  regression,  the  log  of  imputed  rent
significantly  (10%  level)  lowers  contribution  density,  affirming  the  earlier  finding that
savings  in  the  form  of  housing  is  perceived  as  an  alternative  retirement  security
instrument  to the pension system.  Finally, the self employed who expect to  live longer
contribute to the pension system for a greater share of their working lives.
Including the time and risk preference  variables (TIMEPRF and RISKPRF)  in the model,
although on a smaller sample size,  significantly alters the results.59 A cubic polynomial
on AGE, similar to that in the tobit for the entire male sample, is preferred.  However,  the
negative  coefficient  on PAYGREG  is  no longer  significant.  Nor is the  coefficient  on
credit constraints  or on the log of imputed  rent. The self employed with greater patience
and an  aversion to  risk have  a greater contribution  density.  While this  last result may
seem  at  first  glance  to  contradict  the  findings  in Barr  and  Packard  (2002),  since  the
average  age of the sample of self employed men (40) is higher than that of the sample of
wage and salaried  employees  (36), a larger share of their contribution density consists of
contributions  to  the  PAYGO  system prior to the introduction  of individual  accounts  in
1981,  and  thus  to  a  formal  pooling  instrument  that  is  less  risky  to the  individual  by
design.  That the time and risk preference  variables render the coefficient  on PAYGREG
insignificant,  supports this interpretation.
The  results  of probits  estimating  the probability  of contribution  among self employed
men,  are presented  in Tables  12 and 13.  Table  12 presents the results of the model  first
57  There  are  an  insufficient  number  of women of working  age  in  self employment  to allow  a  separate
analysis of male and female entrepreneurs.
58 The earlier concern  for and caution about the possible endogeneity of this variable applies.
59  The  time and risk  preference  data was  only collected  from a sub-sample  of 230  PRIESO respondents.
Running  the regression  on the  smaller sample  without  the preference  variables  does not  alter the  results
shown in the first columns of Table  8.1 1.
28without,  and then with the interaction of MPG and LRENT.  Table  13  shows the effects
of including measures of time and risk preference.
Of the control variables  in the model, only AGE and MARRIED behave differently  than
in the probit on the full sample.  The square polynomial on age was rejected, while being
married  significantly  (10%  level)  lowers  the  likelihood  that  self  employed  men
contribute.  As  in the  probit  on the  full  sample,  the amount  of contributory  benefits
received  by the household  lowers the likelihood of contribution.  The  share of resident
elderly  men increases  the probability  of contribution,  although unlike the earlier probit,
the share  of elderly women has no significant  effect.  None of the variables  included to
capture household-based,  informal pooling are significant.  However,  among the market-
based  alternatives,  holding  productive  assets  (either  a  business,  machinery  or  tools)
significantly  (10%  level)  lowers  the  likelihood  that the  self employed are  contributing.
Just as in the  model  for the full sample,  a greater contribution density significantly (1%
level) increases the probability of further contribution.  Similarly,  crossing the eligibility
threshold  for  the  minimum  pension  guarantee  significantly  (1%  level)  lowers  the
likelihood of further contribution by 14%.
Including  the  interaction  between  MPG  and  LRENT  changes  the results  only slightly.
Resident  extended  family  and  holding  financial  assets  both  significantly  (10%  level)
increase the likelihood of contribution among  self employed men.  Either  result may be
capturing a positive income effect.  However,  as in the second probit specification on the
full sample of working men, once entrepreneurs  have crossed the contribution  threshold
and  are  eligible  for the  minimum  pension  guarantee,  the  rental  value  of their  homes
significantly  (1%  level)  lowers  the  likelihood  of further  contributions  to  the  pension
system.  As discussed earlier,  this may be evidence  of workers  substituting  contribution
to the pension system with saving outside the  system once  they have secured the formal
pooled benefit, since additional contributions to the system are mainly savings.
Due  to  the  small  sample  size  of  self  employed  for  whom  data  on  time  and  risk
preferences  are available,  a more parsimonious model  is required to conserve degrees of
freedom.  For this reason, only the significant variables from the first probit in Table  12
are  used along with the time and risk preference  variables  in the second  specification.6'
As  shown in the first two columns of Table  13,  most of the significant  results  from the
model on the larger sample of self employed still hold on the smaller sample.
In the next two columns of the table, after adding the time and risk preference variables to
the  model,  the  only  remaining  significant  variables  are:,  whether  the  respondent
contributed  to the pension system in  1998 (CONT98);  contribution density (CONDEN);
60  The  Chilean  pension  system  only  - legally  - extends  coverage  to  female  spouses  of contributors.
However,  there  are  a  number  of anecdotes  of self employed  men  receiving  medical  attention  in  the
FONASA system, based on the contributions  of wives  in wage/salaried employment.  While this result may
be evidence  of self employed  men relying  on the contributions  of their  spouses  for coverage,  the binary
variable to control for the effects of a contributing  spouse is not significant.  Removing either variable does
not change the result.
61  1 arrived at the more parsimonious form by following a general-to-specific  procedure that began with all
the variables included in PROBIT I in Table 12.
29and  the  measure  of risk tolerance  (RISKPREF).  Among  self employed  men  - after
controlling  for autocorrelation  in contributions  between consecutive  periods,  as well as
for  the  measured  and  unobservable  variables  that  determine  contribution  density  - a
greater tolerance  for risk significantly (10% level) increases the likelihood of contribution
62 to the pension system.
VII. Conclusion
In the preceding sections I have applied a simple analytical framework borrowed from the
economics  of  insurance  literature  to  examine  individual  and  household  strategies  to
mitigate  the  risk of poverty  in old  age  in  Chile.  Although  the analysis  has  abstracted
from the important inter-temporal,  life-cycle element of savings and insurance decisions,
it has nevertheless  provided  valuable  insights  into  other dimensions  of such  decisions.
The  results  can  be  summarized  by  answering  the  questions  posed  as  hypotheses  in
Section IV.
Are there structural factors that limit access of certain groups to saving and pooling in the
formal pension  system? After controlling  for sector of employment,  and the industry of
employment,  the  variables  capturing  expectations  and  preferences  for  alternative
investments  have  a significant  impact  on  whether  workers  contribute.  Including  the
demand variables  constructed  from the PRIESO  data  in the analysis,  leave most  of the
access  variables  statistically  insignificant.  This  said,  workers  in  large  firms  are  still
significantly  more  likely  to  be  contributing,  raising concern  for workers  employed  in
small firms.  There also appear  to be barriers  preventing women in rural  areas  and those
working in agriculture from formal  cover.
Does  a rise in  the  (perceived)  probability  of old-age  increase  incentives  to  save  in the
formal  system?  The  strong  positive  significance  of subjective  life  expectancy  on  the
contribution density of affiliated  men, suggests that peoples' perceptions of the likelihood
of facing  a period of life  without the ability to work,  influence  their demand  for cover
from the formal  system.  It bears emphasizing that respondents'  expected mortality has a
substantial explained, rational component.
Does greater prevention (which lowers the relative costs of pooling) lower the incentives
to save in the formal system? Although there were few forms of prevention that could be
included  in the  empirical  analysis,  investing  in  productive  assets  - tools,  vehicles  or a
small business  - can postpone  loss of earnings  ability.  There  is evidence  that workers
who  choose  to  invest  in  productive  assets  are  less  likely  to  contribute  to  the  pension
system.  Even among the self employed,  holding productive  assets lowers the likelihood
of contribution.
Do  formal  pension  benefits  received  by  elderly  household  members  increase  the
likelihood that individuals save in the formal system through a demonstration effect?  The
amount of income households  receive  in  contributory  pensions has a positive  effect  on
the contribution  density  of men,  but no  significant  effect  on  that of women.  Benefits
received  by  resident  elderly  women  are  likely  to  have  been  earned  through  the
62 The p-value of the estimated coefficient  on RISKPRF  is 0.085.
30contributions  of a deceased  husband, and thus, less likely to have a "learning"  impact on
the behavior of younger women.  There is no evidence of a negative demonstration effect
on contribution behavior from the amount of non-contributory,  social assistance pensions
received by household members.  This may indicate that social assistance benefits for old
age in Chile are  set sufficiently low as to prevent  moral hazard among those of working
age.
Do individuals  substitute pooling  and saving in the  formal  system with  analogous  risk-
mitigating  behavior  outside  the  system?  The  expectation  of  care  from  children
significantly  lowers  the  likelihood of contribution  to  the pension  system.  The  amount
spent on children's education - a form of pooling as long as supporting children increases
the likelihood of reciprocal support, for parents  in their old age - lowers the likelihood of
contribution  to  the  system.  Since  contributions  to  the  system  up  to  the  minimum
eligibility  threshold  may  be motivated  by a  desire  to  pool  or to  save,  identifying pure
savings  substitutes  requires  controlling  for those  affiliates  who  have eamed  the pooled
benefit.
Do individuals reduce their contributions  to the formal system in favor of saving outside
the system,  once the formal pooled benefit has been secured?  Workers who have met the
contributory  requirements  to  qualify  for  the  minimum  pension  guaranteed  by  the
government  - the  reformed system's remaining  pooling  element against  poverty  in old
age  - are  significantly  less  likely  to continue making  contributions.  The  likelihood of
additional contributions beyond the eligibility threshold is lowered further the greater the
rental  value  of respondents'  homes.  Rather  than  rely  on  the  pension  system  as  an
instrument  for  further  savings,  respondents  who  cross  the  eligibility  threshold  for  the
formal  pooled  benefit  may  prefer  to  diversify  their  retirement  portfolio  by  saving  for
retirement  outside the  system in the form of housing.  This pattern of behavior becomes
statistically  significant  at age  49  - well  under the  age when  Chilean workers  can take
early retirement  legally.
Finally,  demand  for cover  from  the pension  system  seems to  be  largely  determined  by
workers'  risk preferences.  However,  those with a  greater tolerance  for risk contribute,
suggesting  that there  are retirement  security  investments in Chile  that are  perceived as
relatively  less  risky than  saving  in  the  pension  system.  Housing  could  be  one  such
investment.  This  last result could also  indicate  that what  individuals and households  in
Chile  are  seeking  from  the  mandated  pension  system,  is a relatively  greater  degree of
security,  even  if this  comes  in  the  form  of the  modest  annuity  guaranteed  by  the
government.
A valid alternative explanation  for these results,  is that the minimum pension guaranteed
by the govermment  is set too high.  Workers with lower life-time earnings would  not be
able to accumulate a balance  at retirement that could purchase an annuity  for an amount
higher than the  guaranteed  benefit.  For these workers,  contribution up to the eligibility
threshold  may  be a  high-return  investment  option,  while  every  additional  contribution
will be  a  pure  tax (Cox-Edwards,  2000,  Edwards  and  Edwards,  2000).  Yermo  (2001)
uses contribution  density  and  income  data  from the  PRIESO  survey to  simulate  likely
accumulated  savings  at the  age  of retirement  for  the  sample  of respondents,  using  the
parameters  employed by Cox-Edwards  (2000).  He finds that 25% of the women and 5%
31of men who responded to the survey  will not accumulate sufficient  funds to purchase an
annuity greater than the minimum pension guarantee.  For these individuals, contributing
beyond the  twenty years  required to qualify  for the  minimum pension  would be a pure
tax.  However,  running  the probit regressions  shown in Tables  9 and  10  on samples  of
respondents  in different  income  deciles shows that crossing the eligibility threshold  has
no significant impact on the  contribution behaviour  of respondents  whose incomes  place
them below the fifth decile.  It is those respondents  in the fifth income decile and higher
that are driving the substitution result discussed in the last section.
The  results  of this  analysis  suggests  that  with  respect  to  individual  preferences,  the
Chilean  pension  system  may  be  over-designed.  Workers  seem  to  be  using  a  system
intended to act as a vehicle for savings  and investment with a small pooling component,
primarily  as a pooling device.  The falling  share  of contributors  among affiliates  to the
private pension  system shown in Figure  1 is consistent with this finding.  Each cohort of
workers that completes  the 240 months of contributions to the system, may be content to
receive the minimum pension guarantee.  Given the modest amount of the guarantee,  one
would hope that these workers would continue  to save or invest for retirement  outside the
system.  Evidence  presented  in this paper suggests that many do.  However,  Chile may
wish to reevaluate the guarantee and tie it more continuously to years of contributions  in
order to provide a formal pooling option that complements saving in the system by giving
workers an incentive to keep contributing beyond the minimum eligibility threshold.
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40Table 1. Institutional Structure of the Chilean Social Insurance System
I'ir,a  P'illar  SsCe(iii(  l  'illar  TIhirdl  1'i1hr  -Zer  P'ill,ar"  \A>st,kinv
(El  d.l  I  !  ,,di  nt,i
Nature of  Public Mandate,  Public Mandate,  Voluntary,  Non-contributory Transfer,
Institution  Public Management,  Private Management,  Own  Private Management,  Own  General  Taxes
and  Earmarked  Taxes  Savings  Savings/Insurance
financing
Old Age  Minimum Pension  AFP  Adminastradoras  de  Private Employers  and  PASIS: Pensiones
Income  Guarantee:  Fondos de Pensiones  Contractual  Savings  Asistenciales
Security  *  "Top up" by  *  Specialized  Institutions  *  Means-tested  by local
govemment to  retirement fund  *  Employer provided  authorities
workers cannot  managers  plans  *  No contribution
afford a minimum  *  Individual retirement  *  Private annuities  required
annuity  accounts  financed  *  Other market  *  Only eligible if  over
*  For men/women aged  with  100/%  of workers'  insurance - life  the retirement age,
65/60, with 20 years  salary  insurance with  below a certain
of  contnbutions  to  *  Additional 3%  savings options  income, and
the second pillar (an  finances group  *  Other self insurance  receiving no other
AFP)  disability and life  (savings)  instruments  retirement income
*  Minimum annuity  insurance coverage
benchmark is  for contnbutors
inflation indexed  *  Mandatory for all
*  Top up financed from  employees - Self
earmarked,  general  employed and
taxes  employers can
choose whether  to
participate or not
*  Retirement benefit at
65/60 (men/women)






finance  a monthly
benefit equal to the
minimum  pension
guarantee
Health  Public Clinics and  Govemment mandates that  Other Private Health  Coverage of
Hospitals for Indigent  employees  who opt out of  Insurance  "Catastrophic"  Health
FONASA contnbute to  Risks
FONASA (A & B))  ISAPRES  (private
*  7% of salary, for  companies)
coverage ofI 00%  - *  7% of  salary for
75%  of medical  minimum coverage,
costs  with option for better
*  Required proof of  plan at higher
income - certified  prmium
health insurance card  . No requirement that
FONASA (C &  D)  SE be contributing to
*  7% of salary, for
coverage  of less than
75% of medical costs




Note:  Only covers institutional  arrangements  for workers in the private sector and non-military public sector workers.
Chile still administers a separate social insurance regime for its military and police.
41Table 2.  Instruments To Mitigate Poverty from
Loss of Earnings Ability in Old Age
Pooling (QV)  Saving (s)  Prevention (r)
Formal  o  Mandated annuities  o  Mandated  individual  o  Macro-stability  (lower
Public  e  Inflation indexing and  retirement accounts  likelihood of inflation and
indexed securities  shocks)
e  Minimum guaranteed  *  Financial sector regulation
benefits, conditioned on  (to insure sound financial
contributions  sector, and protect
e  Social assistance pensions,  household savings)
conditioned on age and  a  e  Mandated  minimum
means test  education
e  Deposit insurance on  e  Public health
private current and savings
accounts
Formal  e  Private annuities  *  Savings accounts  e  Own education above
Private  o  Term life insurance  *  House (owner-occupier),  mandated minimum
policies  e  Housing finance  e  Own investments  in health
e  Disability insurance  (mortgages and "equity  care above publicly
e  Long-term care insurance  release"  contracts)  provided minimum
e  Property to rent
*  Property/valuables  to sell
e  Own business
Informal  e  Inter household transfers  *  Deposits held in the house  e  Good health - diet and
*  Fertility/children  hold  exercise
*  Children's education  o  Loans to family and friends
*  Resident elderly
e  Resident extended family
42Table 3. Variables Used In Analysis of the Old Age Insurance Decision
Variable  Definition
AGE  age of respondent at the time of the PRIESO
AGEPERD  age parent (of same sex as respondent) died
AGR  binary = I if respondent is employed in  agriculture  at the time of the PRIESO
COLATT  binary = I  if respondent reports owning own home or other residential  property in 1990
CONDEN  reported contnbution density (ratio of  months of contributions /working months)
CONST  binary = I if respondent is employed  in construction at the time of the PRIESO
CONT  binary = I if contributes to the pension  system ("99" during  PRIESO, "98"  during CASEN)
CREDCON  binmary = I if respondent needed but could not obtain credit m the last  12 months
DEATH  binary = I if respondent reports death of a household member m last 3 years
DISAB  how worried respondent is about suffenng physical or mental disability (coded 0 to 10)
EXKIDS  number of expected children
FAMEX  binary = I if respondent expects to live with or be cared for in old age by children
FIN  binary =  I if respondent is employed in financial services at the time of  the PRIESO
FINASST  binary = I  if respondent owned financial assets (bonds, shares,  deposits) in 1990
FSIZE  number of employed in respondent's place of work
GETS  binary = I if household receives money or goods from non family households
GIVES  binary = I If  household gives money or goods to non family households
HEAD  binary =  I if respondent is head of household
HOSP  binary =  I if hospitalized  in the last two years
INFW  binary =  I if respondent is  employed without a contract at the time of the PRIESO
LEDKIDS  log spending  on children's education  in the past month
LIFETAB  average life expectancy,  predicted by life-table for Chile
LJUB  log  income from contributory pensions received by the household
LPASIS  log income from social assistance pensions received by the household
LRENT  log of imputed rent
MARRIED  binary = I if respondent is married
MINES  binary =  I if respondent is employed in mining at the time of the PRIESO
MPG  binary =  I if respondent has qualified for minimum pension guarantee (MPG)
NYFEM  number of women of aged  14 - 60 in the household (other than respondent)
PAYGREG  Binary =  I if respondent entered labor market pnor to 1981
PERLIVE  binary = I if  parent (of same sex as respondent) still lives
PSICK  subjective probability of serious illness, discrete  values from 0 00 to 1.00
RESFAM  binary = I if  respondent reports resident  extended family in the household
RETAIL  binary = I  if respondent is employed in retail commerce at the time of the PRIESO
RISKPRF  Measure of nsk tolerance (certainty equivalent)
RURAL  binary = I if respondent lives in rural area
SELF  binary = I if respondent is self employed  at the time of the PRIESO
SHKIDS  share of children  in the household aged 10 - 13
SHOLDM  share of elderly (over 65) men in the household
SHOLDW  share of elderly (over 60) women in the household
SHYKIDS  share of children in the household aged 0 -9
SICK  binary = I if respondent reports a costly sickness (self, or member of household) in last 3 years
SLIFEX  subjective life expectancy  (expected age of death, minus age at time of PRIESO)
SMOKER  number of cigarettes  smoked in the last month (equals  0 if non-smoker)
SOC  binary = I if  respondent is employed  in social work at the time of  the PRIESO
SPCONT  binary = I if  respondent's spouse contributes to the pension system
TIMEPRF  Measure of time preference (subjective  discount rate)
TRANS  binary =  I if respondent  is employed  in transportation at the time of the PRIESO
UTIL  binary = I if respondent is employed in  utilities at the time of the PRIESO
WORKED  binary =  I if respondent reports ever having been employed
WRKASST  binary = I if  respondent owned own busmess, machinery or tools  in 1990
WRKHRS  number of hours worked  in primary job in the last week
YEDU  years of education
43Table 4.  Instruments To Mitigate Poverty from Loss of Earnings Ability in Old Age
Variables from the PRIESO
Pooling (to)  Saving (s)  Prevention (r)
Formal  o  MPG  o  CONDEN  *  YEDU
Public  o  CONDEN  o  CONT98  *  HOSP
*.  CONT99
(dependant var)
Formal  o  Too few  o  COLATT  o  YEDU  -
Private  observations  o  FINASST  *  WRKASST
*  LRENT  *HOSP
Informal  *  GIVES  o  Too few  o  SMOKER (not
o  GETS  observations  preventing)  f  *  *
o  SHYKIDS  Toofew







Probability of the bad state "p":  AGE,  SLIFEX
Demonstration effect "  I  ':  LJUB,  LPASIS
44Table 5. Do  You Expect to Live with Your Children When You Can No Longer
Care For Yourself?
With Son  With Daughter  With Neither  Total
Obs  %  Obs  %  Obs  °
Rural
No children  10  15.2  12  17.9  75  26.3  97
Less than 3  32  48.5  24  35.8  107  37.5  163
Between 3 - 5  18  27.3  22  32.8  78  27.4  118
More than 5  6  9.1  9  13.4  25  8.8  40
Total  66  100.0  67  100.0  285  100.0  418
Urban
No children  26  22.2  23  12.2  418  26.9  467
Less than 3  64  54.7  88  46.8  591  38.1  743
Between 3 - 5  26  22.2  65  34.6  467  30.1  558
More than 5  1  0.9  12  6.4  76  4.9  89
Total  117  100.0  188  100.0  1,552  100.0  1,860
Source: PRIESO
Table 6.  Do You Expect To Receive  Care from Your Children When You Can No
Longer Care for Yourself?
From Son  From Daughter  From Neither  Doesn't Know  Total
Obs  %  Obs  %  Obs  %  Obs  %
Rural
No children  28  20.9  23  15.3  23  30.7  23  39.0  97
Less than 3  65  48.5  54  36.0  26  34.7  18  30.5  163
Between3-5  32  23.9  56  37.3  19  25.3  11  18.6  118
Morethan5  9  6.7  17  11.3  7  9.3  7  11.9  40
Total  134  100.0  150  100.0  75  100.0  59  100.0  418
Urban
No children  68  18.9  92  15.6  184  33.2  124  34.9  468
Less than 3  170  47.2  244  41.3  201  36.3  128  36.1  743
Between 3  - 5  106  29.4  218  36.9  147  26.5  89  25.1  560
More than 5  16  4.4  37  6.3  22  4.0  14  3.9  89
Total  360  100.0  591  100.0  554  100.0  355  100.0  1,860
Source: PRIESO
45Table 7. OLS Regression  - Subjective Life Expectancy
of Men and Women
Men  Women
SLIFEX  Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err.
LIFETAB  0.854  (0.034)***  0.879  (0.031)***
YEDU  0.281  (0.087)***  0.197  (0.086)**
SMOKER  -1.113  (0.306)***  -1.051  (0.335)***
HOSP  -2.151  (1.051)**  -0.124  (0.717)
PSICK  -32.196  (12.951)***  -25.040  (11.839)**
DEATH  -2.613  (1.813)  -1.025  (1.577)
SICK  0.607  (0.932)  -1.231  (0.852)
DISAB  0.103  (0.114)  -0.221  (0.115)**
PERLIVE  5.953  (2.473)**  6.689  (2.231)***
AGEPERD  0.065  (0.037)*  0.100  (0.034)***
Intercept  -0.817  (3.086)  -5.116  (2.747)
Number of obs  1068  1210
F(  10,  1057)  156.420  F(  10,  1199)  200.370
Prob > F  0.000  0.000
R 2 0.597  0.626
Adj  R2 0.593  0.623
"***  statistically significant  at 1%; "**" at 5%; and "*" at  10%
46Table 8.  Tobit Regressions  - "Contribution Density"
(Men and Women of Working Age who Responded to the PRIESO)
Men, aged  14 - 65  Women, aged  14 - 60
CONDEN  Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err.
AGE  0.256  (0.031)***  0.310  (0.049)***
AGE2 -0.006  (0.001)***  -0.008  (0.001)***
AGE3 4.7E-05  (0.000)***  6.9E-05  (0.000)***
HEAD  0.084  (0.046)*  -0.018  (0.056)
MARRIED  0.017  (0.035)  -0.085  (0.046)*
YEDU  0.024  (0.004)***  0.026  (0.005)***
WORKED  0.289  (0.050)***  0.419  (0.038)***
SPCONT  0.002  (0.036)  0.047  (0.043)
PAYGREG  -0.140  (0.054)***  0.031  (0.077)
CREDCON  -0.126  (0.030)***  -0.114  (0.038)***
EXKIDS  0.016  (0.010)*  -0.050  (0.014)***
LEDKIDS  0.004  (0.003)  0.002  (0.004)
FAMEX  0.016  (0.026)  -0.033  (0.036)
GIVES  0.043  (0.028)  0.028  (0.038)
GETS  -0.046  (0.035)  0.031  (0.044)
LRENT  -0.006  (0.003)**  -0.006  (0.004)
COLATT  0.030  (0.032)  0.051  (0.042)
FINASST  0.031  (0.108)  0.030  (0.165)
WRKASST  -0.096  (0.031)***  0.119  (0.051)**
SLIFEX  0.003  (0.001)***  -1.8E-04  (0.001)
LJUB  0.012  (0.004)***  0.001  (0.005)
LPASIS  0.002  (0.007)  -0.011  (0.010)
Intercept  -3.580  (0.362)  -3.924  (0.556)
Number of obs  935  982
left censored  198  449
uncensored  737  533
Log likelihood  -476.391  -648.5207
LR ;2 (22)  469.95  361.410
Prob> x2  0.000  0.000
Pseudo R 2 0.330  0.218
statistically significant at  1%; "**"  at 5%; and "*" at 10%
47Table 9. Contribution to the Pension  System  in December  1999- January 2000
Employed Men of Working Age (14 - 65)
PROBIT I  PROBIT 2  MEAN
CONT99  dF/dx  Std. Err  dF/dx  Std  Err.
AGE99  0.035  (0.013)***  0.035  (0.013)***  37.66
AGE
2 -3.9E-04  (1.6E-04)***  -3.9E-04  (1.5E-04)***  1546 63
HEAD  -0.077  (0 067)  -0.046  (0.064)  0 74
MARRIED  -0 041  (0.050)  -0.057  (0.048)  0 59
SPCONT  -0 012  (0.047)  -0.026  (0 043)  0.19
YEDU  -0.005  (0.006)  -0.003  (0 005)  9.62
RURAL  0.022  (0.053)  0.017  (0.050)  0.20
FSIZE  0.001  (3.2E-04)*  4.9E-04  (3.OE-04)  66.68
WRKHRS  4 OE-04  (0 001)  0.001  (0 001)  50.49
SELFPR  -0.555  (0.088)***  -0.540  (0.093)***  0.25
INFWPR  -0.542  (0.083)***  -0.531  (0.089)***  0  16
AGR  0.116  (0.082)  0  109  (0.078)  006
MINES  -0.059  (0.109)  -0.122  (0.106)  0.05
UTIL  0238  (0.145)  0.214  (0.135)  007
CONST  -0 059  (0.082)  -0 082  (0 080)  0.09
RETAIL  0 027  (0 096)  -0.012  (0 090)  0 07
TRANS  0 034  (0 071)  0.015  (0 067)  0.23
FIN  -0 026  (0 079)  -0.062  (0 075)  0 15
SOC  0.076  (0 076)  0.047  (0 072)  0.21
CREDCON  -0.106  (0.044)**  -0.101  (0.043)**  0.26
SHYKIDS  4.2E-04  (0.001)  0 001  (0 001)  18.18
SHKIDS  1.8E-04  (0.002)  -1.2E-04  (0 002)  678
SHOLDM  0.007  (0.003)***  0.006  (0.003)**  1 41
SHOLDW  -0.004  (0.002)**  -0.005  (0.002)***  2 71
NYFEM  -0 004  (0 027)  -0 003  (0.026)  1.25
RESFAM  -0.008  (0.085)  -0.012  (0 077)  0.04
EXIUDS  -0.007  (0.013)  -0.007  (0.012)  2.59
LEDKIDS  -0 005  (0.004)  -0.007  (0.004)*  5 32
FAMEX  -0.083  (0.039)**  -0.088  (0.037)**  0 53
GIVES  0.072  (0.039)*  0.049  (0.037)  0.34
GETS  0 052  (0.047)  0 034  (0.045)  0  17
LRENT  -0.001  (0.005)  0.003  (0.004)  6 37
COLATT  0.092  (0.047)**  0.113  (0.046)***  0 46
FINASST  0017  (0 113)  0023  (0.101)  002
WRKASST  -0.031  (0.045)  -0.013  (0 043)  0.30
SLIFEX  0.001  (0  002)  0 001  (0 001)  37.63
LJUB  -0.019  (0.007)***  -0.016  (0.006)***  0.96
LPASIS  0.016  (0.013)  0.017  (0.012)  030
CONT98  0.179  (0.042)***  0.175  (0.042)***  0 60
CONDEN  OA20  (0.093)***  0.401  (0.092)***  0 52
MPG  -0.125  (0.067)**  0  151  (0.101)  0  16
MPG*LRENT  -0.040  (0.013)***  1.13
Number of obs  741  741
Log likelihood  -124.441  -117 749
LR chi2(41)  698 540  LR chi2(42)  711  920
Prob> chl2  0.000  obs. P. 0.663  0000  obs  P  0.663
Pseudo  R2  0.737  pred  P  0.894  0751  pred. P  0906
48Table 10. Contribution to the Pension System  in December  1999- January 2000
Employed Women of Working Age (14 - 60)
PROBIT I  PROBIT 2  MEAN
CONTPR  dF/dx  Std. Err  dF/dx  Std  Err
AGE99  -0 017  (0.041)  -0 017  (0 042)  38.14
AGE
2 4 7E-04  (0.001)  0 000  (0 001)  157120
HEAD  0186  (0.140)  0.264  (0.150)*  021
MARRIED  0.257  (0.134)**  0.266  <0.136)**  0.43
SPCONT  0.012  (0.121)  0017  (0.126)  035
YEDU  0.007  (0 015)  0.010  (0 016)  10.19
RURAL  -0.181  (0 120)  -0.221  (0.127)*  0.15
FSIZE  0.002  (0.001)*  0.002  (0.001)*  60.21
WRKHRSA  -0.001  (0 003)  -0 002  (0.003)  43.96
SELFPR  -1.117  (0.211)***  -1.184  (0.228)***  0 18
INFWPR  -0.971  (0.168)***  -1.021  (0.181)***  0.23
AGR  -0.571  (0.435)  -0.768  (0.457)*  0 05
MINES  0.012  (0343)  0.011  (0.347)  010
UTIL  -0.288  (0.302)  -0.300  (0.305)  0.15
CONST  -0.088  (0 312)  -0.074  (0 316)  0.19
RETAIL  -0.084  (1.073)  -0.005  (I  158)  0.01
TRANS  -0.054  (0.322)  -0 027  (0.328)  0.08
FIN  -0.042  (0 374)  -0 046  (0.382)  0 03
SOC  -0.136  (0306)  -0.124  (0.310)  034
CREDCON  -0.182  (0.094)*  -0.216  (0.099)**  0 28
SHYKIDS  -0.001  (0 003)  -0.002  (0 003)  15.27
SHKIDS  0.007  (0.004)*  0.007  (0.004)*  7 80
SHOLDM  0 010  (0.012)  0 011  (0 012)  1 54
SHOLDW  0.002  (0.006)  0 001  (0 006)  3 46
NYFEM  0.119  (0.065)*  0.119  (0.067)*  1 64
RESFAM  -0.482  (0.238)**  -0.518  (0.238)**  0 04
EXKIDS  -0 064  (0 042)  -0.069  (0.042)*  2.21
LEDKIDS  -0.010  (0.011)  -0011  (O011)  554
FAMEX  0.099  (0.093)  0.117  (0.096)  0 56
GIVES  -0 066  (0.094)  -0.059  (0.097)  0 35
GETS  0.024  (0.120)  0.041  (0  121)  0.16
LRENT  0 008  (0.011)  0.000  (0.012)  6 76
COLATT  -0112  (0.107)  -0104  (0.108)  045
FINASST  (dropped  due to collinearity)
WRKASST  0.180  (0.141)  0 211  (0.149)  0.17
SLIFEX  0.004  (0.004)  0 005  (0.004)  35.26
LJUB  -0.019  (0.022)  -0 021  (0.022)  1.44
LPASIS  0.030  (0.038)  0.033  (0 040)  0.21
CONT98  0.210  (0.098)**  0.188  (0.102)*  0.53
CONDEN  0.813  (0.189)***  0.865  (0.197)***  0 40
MPG  -0 105  (0 181)  -0.459  (0.275)*  0.14
MPG*LRENT  0.054  (0.030)*  0 87
Number of obs  396  396
Log likelihood  -55.458  -53.665
LR chi2(40)  420  100  LR chi2(41)  423 690
Prob>chi2  0.000  obs  P: 0606  0.000  obs. P: 0 606
Pseudo R2  0 791  pred. P. 0.799  0.798  pred. P  0.799
49Table  11. Tobit Regressions  - "Contribution Density" of Self Employed,  Without and With
Preference Variables
(Men of Working Age who Responded to the PRIESO)
w/o Pref. Variables, Full  w/o Pref. Variables, Exp.  With Pref Variables, Exp.
Sample  Sample  Sample
CONDEN  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error
AGE99  0.261  (0.113)**  0.460  (0.183)**  0.583  (0.152)***
AGE2 -0.005  (0.003)*  -0.010  (0.005)**  -0.014  (0.004)***
AGE3 3.40E-05  -2.20E-05  7.9E-05  (3.7E-05)**  1.IE-04  (3.2E-05)***
HEAD  -0.022  -0.134
MARRIED  0.135  -0.095
YEDU  0.019  (0.009)**  0.031  (0.019)*  0.052  (0.017)***
WORKED  0.088  -0.2
SPCONT  -0.031  -0.078
PAYGREG  -0.292  (0.141)**  -0.161  (0.267)  -0.247  (0.223)
CREDCON  -0.151  (0.077)**  -0.088  (0.164)  -0.060  (0.140)
EXKIDS  0.014  -0.022
LEDKIDS  0.002  -0.007
FAMEX  0.105  -0.066
GIVES  0.071  -0.067
GETS  0.058  -0.099
LRENT  -0.014  (0.008)*  -0.005  (0.016)  -0.011  (0.013)
COLATT  -0.006  -0.081  -0.136  (0.160)  -0.204  (0.136)
FINASST  0.311  (0.173)*  (dropped due to collinearity)
WRKASST  -0.09  -0.07  -0.207  (0.135)  -0.288  (0.116)**
SLIFEX  0.006  (0.003)**  0.008  (0.005)  0.016  (0.005)***
LYJUB  0.023  (0.010)**  -0.018  (0.022)  -0.001  (0.019)
LYPASIS  0.03  -0.026
TIMEPREF  -0.710  (0.177)***
RISKPREF  -2.9E-04  (7.7E-05)***
Intercept  -4.218  (1.460)***  -6.442  (2.417)***  -7.015  (1.938)***
Number of obs  186  62  60
left censored  46  18  17
uncensored  140  44  43
Log likelihood  -110.764  -43.512  -28.516
LR Z'  (22)  62.35  LR  2  (11)  14.73  LR  X2 (13)  3997
Prob> x2  0.000  0.000  0.000
Pseudo R 2
0  0.145  0.412
"***" statistically significant  at 1%; "l'"  at 5%; and "*" at 10%
50Table 12. Contribution to the Pension System  Among Self Employed
in December  1999- January 2000
(Men of Working Age)
PROBIT I  PROBIT 2  MEAN
CONT99  dF/dx  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Std. Err.
AGE99  0.008  (0.004)**  0.009  (0.004)***  41.12
HEAD  0 040  (0.092)  -0.009  (0.088)  0.80
MARRIED  -0.115  (0.063)*  -0.106  (0.062)*  0.69
SPCONT  0.017  (0.047)  0.005  (0.046)  0.24
YEDU  -0.005  (0.005)  -0.004  (0.005)  10.02
RURAL  -0.011  (0.053)  -0.010  (0.050)  0.22
FSIZE  0.001  (0.000)**  0.001  (5E-04)**  13.77
WRKHRS  0.002  (0.001)**  0.002  (0.001)**  53.14
CREDCON  -0.039  (0.052)  -0.020  (0.049)  0.31
SHYKIDS  0.002  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  17.77
SHKIDS  0.003  (0.002)  0.002  (0.002)  6.31
SHOLDM  0.008  (0.004)**  0.006  (0.004)*  2.11
SHOLDW  -0.003  (0.003)  -0.004  (0.003)  3.26
NYFEM  0.018  (0.032)  -0.010  (0 033)  1.26
RESFAM  0.110  (0.089)  0.140  (0.086)*  0.05
EXKIDS  -0.005  (0.015)  -0.003  (0.014)  2.69
LEDKIDS  -0.006  (0.005)  -0.006  (0.005)  5.95
FAMEX  -0.049  (0.045)  -0.045  (0.043)  0.51
GIVES  0.058  (0.039)  0.036  (0.036)  0.38
GETS  -0.041  (0.062)  -0.018  (0.059)  0.13
LRENT  0.003  (0.005)  0.007  (0.006)  7.37
COLATT  0.010  (0.052)  0.001  (0.048)  0.63
FINASST  0.130  (0.106)  0.155  (0.104)*  0.03
WRKASST  -0.071  (0.046)*  -0.053  (0.043)  0.57
SLIFEX  0.003  (0.002)  0.002  (0.002)  33.38
LJUB  -0.021  (0.009)**  -0.020  (0.009)***  1.23
CONT98  0.185  (0.058)***  0.181  (0.062)***  0.35
CONDEN  0.310  (0.101)***  0.334  (0.111)***  0.36
MPG  -0.141  (0.073)***  0.128  (0.136)  0.14
MPG*LRENT  -0.035  (0.018)***  1.10
Intercept  -0.781  (0.245)  -0.782  (0.269)  1.00
Number of  obs  183  183
Log likelihood  -53.531  -48.779
LRchi2(29)  85.130  94.630
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000
Pseudo R2  0.443  0.492
obs. P  0.219  0.219
pred. P  0.061  (at x-bar)  0.053  (at x-bar)
statistically significant  at 1%; "**"  at 5%; and "*"  at 10%
51Table 13. Contribution to the Pension System Among Self Employed
in December 1999- January 2000 - Including Preference Variables
(Men of Working Age)
Without Preference  Variables  With Preference Variables  MEAN
CONT99  dF/dx  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Std. Err.
AGE  0.009  (0.005)*  4.3E-04  (0.001)  39.89
HEAD  0.79




FSIZE  0.001  (0.001)  7.OE-05  (3.1E-04)  12.73
















WRKASST  -0.147  (0.087)*  -0.020  (0.051)  0.61
SLIFEX  34.69
LJUB  -0.048  (0.031)*  -0.007  (0.021)  0.92
CONT98  0.334  (0.166)***  0.046  (0.131)*  0 24
CONDEN  0.278  (0.137)**  0.054  (0.154)*  0.36
MPG  -0.221  (0.144)*  -0.042  (0.118)  0.15
MPG*LRENT  (dropped, predicts failure perfectly)  1.10
TIMEPREF  -0.017  (0.059)  0.44
RISKPREF  1.3E-05  (4E-05)*  3460.00
Intercept  -0.752  (0.322)***  -0.127  (0.360)*  1.00
Number of obs  62  60
Log likelihood  -16.121  -7.673
LR chi2(10)  36.370  LR chi2(12)  52.130
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000
Pseudo R2  0.530  0.773
obs. P  0.242  0.250
pred. P  0.071  0.003
'"*""'statistically significant  at 1%; "**"  at 5%; and""  at 10%
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Appendix One
Sample Frame and Field Report'
for the
Social Risk Management Survey
Encuesta de Prevision de Riesgos Sociales (PRIESO)
Santiago,  Chile, December  1999 - January 2000
A.1.I. Background
The  World  Bank  and  the  Department  of Economics  at the  University  of Chile  (Survey
Unit), conducted a survey to identify and evaluate the strategies taken by individuals - and
by groups of individuals  in the household  - in the face of a series of risks to income. The
questionnaire  explores  both  institutional  strategies  as  well  as  informal  or  traditional
strategies taken by households  in the face of income risks arising from the inability to work
in  old age,  disability,  work injury,  and  the  death  of an  income  earning  spouse  or  other
household member.
The PRIESO questionnaire  was designed by Truman Packard (Department of Economics at
the University of Oxford, for the World Bank) and Josd Cuesta (Queen Elizabeth  House at
the  University  of Oxford)  under  the  direction  of Robert  Holzrnann  (Director  of Social
Protection,  World Bank), and with the help of Emesto  Castillo Norbona and Ada Guzman
(Survey Unit, University of Chile).2
A.1.H.  The Sample Frame
The sample  frame used  in the design of the PRIESO,  is based  on that developed  for the
CASEN 1998 by Chilean National  Statistics Institute (INE) and the Survey Unit, using data
from the last national census conducted in Chile in 1992.  The population represented in the
sample consists  of individuals  aged  14  and over  residing the  in the Greater Metropolitan
Region of Santiago,  who responded  to the CASEN  1998.  The sample  was constructed  to
include urban as well as rural households.
l I would like to thank MIDEPLAN for granting permission for the use of their sample  frame for the PRIESO
and to Don Fernando  Flores,  Julio Mufioz  and Emesto  Castillo for their hard work to take  full advantage of
this opportunity.  This annex contains  excerpts  from a longer field report of the PRIESO  survey,  prepared by
Julio Muffoz,  and available  in Spanish upon request.
2  Extensive  and  valuable  input  was  provided  by  Salvador  Valdes-Prieto  (Catholic  University  of Chile),
Andras Uthoff (ECLA),  John Hoddinott (IFPRI), Abigail Barr, David Bevan (University of Oxford), Emanuel
Jimenez,  Margaret Grosh,  and Kinnon Scott (World  Bank).  Estelle James,  William  Maloney,  Indermit  Gill,
Ana-Maria  Arriagada,  Laura Rawlings,  Kathy Lindert,  Gillette  Hall, Edmundo  Murrugarra,  Robert Palacios,
David  Lindeman, and Claudio  Montenegro  (World Bank)  also provided helpful comments.  Suggestions  on
the  language employed  and exact  phrasing of questions were  received from  Ana Maria  Urutia and  Isabelle
Rodriquez  (Instituto  de  Asuntos  Culturales,  ICA  Chile).  All  errors  are  the  responsibility  of the  survey's
principal authors.
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The sample was stratified by conglomerates.  In each strata an independent,  representative
sample  was  obtained.  Grouping  these  independent  samples  together  produces  a
representative sample of the Greater Metropolitan  Region.
Stratification
The sample was stratified to include urban and rural households in the Greater Metropolitan
Region of Santiago.  For  the  purpose  of stratification  the  geographic  unit  "sub-district"
(subcomuna)  was defined,  that involves  splitting existing  districts  in two parts:  an urban
sub-district  and  a  rural  sub-district,  according  to  the  definitions  of  urban and  rural,
provided by INE.
Sampling Units
Primary Sampling Units (PSU)
In  Greater Urban  Santiago  all  sub-districts  were  considered.  As such  the
PSUs consist of all the sectors within the  sub-districts  covered by the  1992
National Census.
Secondary  Sampling Units (SSU)
The SSU consist of permanently  occupied residences that exist at the time of
updating the frame.
Tertiary Sampling Units (TSU)
The  TSUs  consist  of permanent  household  residents,  14  and  older,  that
responded  to  the  CASEN  1998.  This  last  sampling  unit  was the  unit  of
study.
The sample size was set at 2,500 individuals aged  14 and over in the Greater Metropolitan
Region of Santiago: 2,000 from urban households and 500 from rural households - an 80%
to  20%  urban/rural  distribution  to  approximately  match  the  distribution  of the  Chilean
population.  In order to end up with a number of usable observations relatively  close to the
sample size with which the study was conceived,  2944 individuals were selected, of which
2441  are urban and 503 are rural.
A.1.III.  Selecting the Sample
All  sub-districts  were  included  from  both  Greater  Urban  Santiago  and  Greater  Rural
Santiago.  The sectors  within each sub-district  were  selected with probability proportional
to  size  (PPT).  The households  selected within  each sector  were  selected randomly.  The
respondent selected  in each household was also selected randomly from among respondents
to the CASEN 1998 aged 14 and over.
Probability  of Selection.  The probability  of selecting  a primary  sampling  unit (PSU),  or
sector  within a sub-district  is "with probability  proportional  to  estimated  size",  using the
estimated probabilities from the  1992 National Census.
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_M,
Z  =  i
M
Where:
M, =Number of residences in sector i, according to the  1992.
M = E  or number of residences in the respective sub-district.
Secondary Sampling Units (SSU).  The probability of selecting a secondary  sampling  unit
(SSU) or residence,  depends on two values:  the number of residences  interviewed in sector
i  and the number  of residences  found  in that sector during the revalidation  of the frame.
The  average  number of residences  that were  expected  to be interviewed  were  5  in urban
areas and  10 in rural areas.  This implied surveying all of the households or "family nuclei"
that exist in the residence sampled.
m7  = average number of households to interview per sector
m,  = number of households interviewed  in sector i
M; = updated number of households  in sector i
Tertiary Sampling Units (TSUs).  The  probability  of selecting  an individual  within  the
household (TSU) depends  on the number  H,k  of individuals  14 or older ke household of
the  jth residence of the ith sector.
Sampling Fraction. The sampling  fraction  - the ratio between the theoretical size of the
sample, and the size of the population  is
nM,  mn  1
M  M;H.,k
where  i refers to the sector, j  to the residence  and  k to the household or "family  nucleus".
In practice m had to be substituted often with in,.
Expansion Factor. The expansion  factor is the reciprocal value of the sample fraction, and
is a function of the number of individuals  14 and older in each household.  This factor acts
as  a weight on each individual  surveyed  and expresses  the number  of individuals  that the
respondent  represents.  The  total  estimator  results  from  taking  the  mean  value  of the
product of multiplying the expansion factor by the value of any given variable.
A.1.IV.  Pilots Final Protocol,  and Training
Most of  the questions in the PRIESO have  never been asked in previous surveys  in Chile.
For this reason, particular attention was paid to whether respondents  would understand the
topics being covered, especially those in Module's  I (Risk Perception),  II (Evaluation of the
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Pension  System)  and  III  (Financial  Strategies).  Two  separate  pilots were  conducted  to
evaluate  the  survey's  length,  the  wording  of questions  and  to  verify  whether  responses
made sense.
The  first  pilot  consisted  of 40  interviews  conducted  by  8 numerators  the  weekend  of
August  28  - 31,  1999.  The  average  length  of the  interview  was  39  minutes.  After
extensive changes to the questionnaire  a second pilot of 60 interviews was conducted  from
November  6  - 9,  1999.  The  average  interview  length  was  cut to  32  minutes.  Further
changes brought the average length down to 28 minutes per interview.
University  students working toward  undergraduate  degrees in sociology and economics,  as
well as regular  Survey Unit staff experienced  in conducting  the CASEN,  were enlisted as
potential  numerators.  Each was given a copy of the questionnaire  to take home and study
prior  to the  first  training  session.  In  this  session each  question  was  read  and  the  intent
behind the question explained.  Of the 93  candidates  who signed up as numerators, only 65
passed the training and took part in actual interviews.
A.1.V.  Fieldwork & Results
Interviews  for  the PRIESO  began  on December  11,  1999.  Each numerator  was initially
assigned no more than 2 sectors (a maximum of 10  interviews), and was required to turn in
the  first  3 completed  interviews  for  inspection  to  detect  and  eliminate  any  random  or
systematic errors, and to clear up any doubts that arose in the first wave of the survey.
Field work  extended  until  January  27,  2000.  The  field  work took longer than originally
expected  due to the complexity of the questions being asked, the need  for follow up visits
to  most  households,  normal  procedures  to  validate  the  data  from  randomly  selected
interviews, and  delays brought  about by presidential  elections  in Chile.  The results of the
field work are presented in the table below.  Despite some deterioration in the sample frame
since it was last used in November - December  1998, a 77% response rate was achieved.
Table A.1.1.  PRIESO Results of Field Work
Result  Urban  Rural  Total
n  %  n  %  n  %
Sample  2,441  100.0%  503  100.0%  2,944  100.0%
Surveys completed  1,860  76.2%  418  83.1%  2,278  77.4%
Household changed  residence  177  7.3%  28  5.6%  205  7.0%
Respondent changed residence  119  4.9%  13  2.6%  132  4.5%
Respondent not home  75  3.1%  13  2.6%  88  3.0%
No one home  61  2.5%  12  2.4%  73  2.5%
Respondent deceased/incapacitated  54  2.2%  14  2.8%  68  2.3%
Refusals  52  2.1%  3  0.6%  55  1.9%
No one lives  in the  residence  43  1.8%  2  0.4%  45  1.5%
It should be noted that 12.3% of the sample had changed  residence since the CASEN  1998
was completed.  This level of movement is significant and should not be ignored.  Sample
specialists at the Survey Unit claim that this sort of mobility  is normal in Chile, and that it
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represents  both  "pull  and  "push"  migration,  as  well  as  the  Chilean  (and  wider  Latin
American)  custom of sending  a household member  to reside (allegarse) with friends and
family members in response to income shocks.  While an entire module of the PRIESO was
designed  specifically  to  capture  these  traditional  forms  of risk  management,  we  were
unable  to  interview  this  particularly  large  group  of potential  respondents.  Ideally,  we
would follow up on this movement.  The migrant data would add a valuable  dimension to
the  larger  data  set  as  well  as  provide  materials  for  a  fuller  analysis  of  social  risk
management.
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PRIESO: Social Risk Management Survey - Santiago, Chile
December 1999/January  2000,  English Translation  of Final  Version
Segment:
Address:  District:
Numerator:  Socio-economic  Classification:
I'  Visit:  /  /  1999,  Hour:  :  Result:
2nd Visit:  /  /1999,  Hour:  :  Result:
3d  Visit:  /  /1999,  Hour:  :  Result:
Duration of Interview:  minutes
MODULE I.  HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION
To all household  members  Only to those 14 and older
Write first  Relation to house hold  Sex  Age  Did  Goes to  Last educational  Did you have  Were you  Why weren't
name of  head  you  school or  grade level  paid work/job  looking for paid  you looking for
all  reside  ed.  reached/course  last week?  work/job?  paid work/job?
household  I Household head  here  m  institution?  completed?
members  2 Spouse/partner  Nov.
3 Son/daughter  1998?  1  Retired
4 Father/mother  I Pre-school  2 HH tasks
5  Father/mother in law  2 Lower Primary  3 Study
6 Son/daughter in law  3 Pnmary  I Yes, looking  4 Family work
7 Grandson/daughter  4 Lower Secondary  for first time  non-paid
8 Brother/sister  I Yes  5 Upper Secondary  5 Disabled
Total No.  9 Brother/sister in law  I Male  In years  2 No  6 Tech. tramning  I Yes 4  Qll  2 Yes, currently  6 Elderly
of HH  10 Other family  2 Female  completed  I Yes  7 Profess. institute  2 No 4  Q9  unemployed  7 Other
members:  11 Non family  2 No  8 Undergraduate  4  Go to Ql I  Specify
12 Dom service resident  9 Graduate
13 Dom scrvice non  m.  3  No*  QIO  Go to  Ql I
No  1  2  3  4  5  6  Grade  Type  8  9  10




11.  This residence is a  .... ?  16.  In the  last three years, have  you had to  face one  of the
following problems  that have negatively  effected  your
I  [  ] House  economic situation and/or that of your household?
2 [  Condominium  (multiple responses allowed)
3 [  ] Apartment  in building
4 [  Room (s) in apartment  I [  ] Economic recession that caused loss of income
5 [ ] Room  in old house or convent  2 [  ] Political  change that caused loss of income
6 [] Mediagua o mejora  3 [  I Natural disaster (floods, drought, earthquake,
7 [] Shanty  etc.).
8 [] Other (mobile, tent, etc.).  4 [  ] Disability of a family member that contributed to
Specify.  household income, or worked
5 [  ] Death of a family member who contributed to
12.  The home you reside  in is .... ?  household  income, or worked
6 [  ] A sickness expensive to treat (that cost more than
I [  I Owned and paid for  a month's income to treat)
2 [ ] Owned and still making payments  7 [  ] Other unforeseen event
3  [  Rented  Specify:
4 [ ] Provided by your employer  8 [  ] No such event - Go to Q20
5 [  Provided by family or friends
17.  Which of these effected you most economically?
MODULE II.  RISK PERCEPTION
We  will now ask you  some questions with  respect to the  18.  How much money did the event cost you?
current situation of you  and your family,  as weUl  as your
expectations  for the  future.  $  pesos
13.  On a scale from  I to 7, where  I is very bad  and 7 very  19.  How did you solve the problem?
good, how would you rate your quality of life and that
of your household?  Note:  Read  first the titles in block letters.  According to the
block letter titles selected by the respondent, read the
Personal:  Household:  options  under the  title.  The  respondent can  select
multiple titles and  options under each title.
14.  Which  of the  following  statements,  best define  your
household?  (Multiple responses allowed)  10 [ ] COULD NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM
AND IT REDUCED MY LIVING
10 [  ] We depend on help from family or the state  STANDARD
20 [  ] We often go into debt to meet basic expenses
30 [  ] We can't go into debt, and have to adjust when  20 [  BY USING YOUR SAVINGS
there is a shortage of income
40 [  ] We do not go into debt, but we do not have  & [  ] BY USING SUBSIDIES,  PENSIONS OR
enough to save  INSURANCE
& [] We save for/to
51 [  Future emergencies  30 [ ] Work injury subsidy
52 [  Invest  32  [ ] Unemployment subsidy
53[ ] For old age  32 [ ] Severance payments
54 [1 Other objective - Specify:  33  [  ] Social assistance  pensions PASIS
34 [ ] Single family subsidy SUF
15.  Compared to the current economic situation, do you  35 [ ] FONASA (public health insurance)
expect the economic situation in Chile to... ?  36 [ ] ISAPRE (private health insurance)
37 [ ] Early pension for old age
Economic situation in Chile.  38  [ ] Social assistance pension
Period  I Improve  39 [  1 Other subsidy or insurance.
2 No change  Specify:
3 Get worse
4 Impossible to predict  & [  ] BY SELLING A GOOD OR PROPERTY
5 Doesn't know
a. The next year  41 [  ] Livestock
b The  next five  42 [  ] An automobile
years  43  [  ] An appliance
44 [  ] A piece of property
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45 [1] Pawning a possession  20.  How  probable  is  it that  one  or more  of the  following
46 [  ] Selling some other good  events could  happen  to you or to a household  member
Specify :_________within  the next  12 months?
& []BY  ASKING  FOR A LOAN:  To you  To a house hold
____  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___m  em  ber
51 [IA bank or other commercial  lender  Events
52 [ICompensation Fund  I Ver  probable  I Very probable
55 [1 Your  employer  (an  advance)  ~~~~~~~~~~~2  Probable  2  Probable 55  Your employer (an  advance)  ~~~~~~~~~~~~3  A bit probable  3 A bit probable
54 []A money  lender  4  Not probable  4  Not probable
55 [1Family member or friend  ____________5  Not applicable  5  Not applicable
56 [1Other lending entity  a. Loss ofjob for a week  ______________
Specify:  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
b. Loss ofjob for longer
&~  BY WORKING  MORE  than  a year________
c. Forced temporary
61  1 ] Work extra hours  closure of business  ________________
62 [  ] Finding a second job
63 [1]  Starting own b  usiness - self employment  d. Bankruptcy of business  _______
64 [1] Other,  Specify:  e. Loss of clients  _______  _______
& []BY SENDING  A HOUSHOLD  MEMBER  TO WORK  f. Loss of property or
other possession__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
711[]  Sending spouse to find job  g  eiu  lns
72 [1] Child to work w/o removing from school  g  eiu  lns  ______  ______
73  [1] Pulling child out of school to work  h. Serious  accidentlIinjury  ______________
74 [1] Sending another household member to  work  i. Physical  incapacity  ______  ______
Specify:  j____Death__
& []REDUCING AND/OR  CUTTING SPENDING ON ...:k  eieetbcueo
Cutting  Reducing  old age  ______  ______
81  [1  81  [  Recreation21  Wolyobealtohnltesevt?
82  [1  82  [1Education/educational  materials21  Wolyubeaetohdetesevn?
83[  83[  Health  1[  Yes.  - Go toQ22
84  [1  84  [1Housing (payment, rent, etc)  2 1]No.  -4  Go to Q23
85[  85[]Food
86  [1]  86 [1Utility bills  22.  Why would you be able to handle these events?
87 [  ]  87  Another expense  ~~~~(multiple responses allowed)
& WITH THE HELP OF FRIENDS  AND/ORk FAMILY  1 [1]  Formnal pension system (INP,  AFP, etc.)
OUTSIDE THE HOUSEHOLD  2  [1] Formnal health system (FONASA, ISAPRE, etc.)
91  [ ] Taking up residence with  a family member  4 [1] Haeln  tote Muultwrnuyinsurance)
92 [ ] Sending a child or elder to live with family  Sp  av  te ifynsurance  _______
93  [ ]With some other assistance  from family/  5  SHaemony:masvng  con
friends  LI  aemoe  nasvig  con
Specify:  ___________6  [1]  Have  invested in goods and machinery
7 1]Have property
8 []Have thtings in my house I can sell
9 [1Have many kids who can work
10 f  ] Can count on the help of family (besides  children)
and friends
1 I  []Can apply for a loan
12 [  I Government assistance is sufficient
13  [1Other -Specify:  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
GO TO MODULE  III
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23.  Why  would  you  be  unable  to  haiidle  these  events?  27. Using a scale of I to 7, where  I indicates  very bad and 7
(multiple responses allowed)  indicates very good, how would you grade the following
features of the AFP Pension System?
1 [ ] I am still recovering from the last serious  event
2 []I don't have insurance  Feature  Grade  Don't
3 [  ] My insurance would not cover events  know/
4 [] Will not qualify for the minimum pension  don't
5  [ ]I don't have a job or other source of income  respond
6 [ ]I have no savings and no investments  a. Payment of pensions
8  [1] There is nothing in my house I can sell  b. Level of contributions
9 []I don't have children who could work  .
10 [  ] Family (not kids) and friends could not help  c. Level of commissions
11 [  ] No access to loans or credit  d.  Use of funds in  case of
12 [  ] Government assistance is unavailable or  emergency
insufficient
13 [ 1 Other -Specify:  e. Security of the investments
GO TO MODULE III  f. Switching between AFPs
g. Overall grade for system
MODULE III.  EVALUATION  OF THE
PENSION  SYSTEM  28. Do you think it  is probable that the AFP Pension System
We will now ask you some questions about the Chilean Social  will still exist 20 years from now?
Security System  generally, and  follow with questions about  I  Very probable
your Pension System  in particular.  2  Probable
24.  Until what age do you believe you will live?  3 [  A bit probable
4 [1No probability
_______  old  5[] Don't know
25.  Until what age do you think you'll be able to keep  29.  Do  you  believe  that  the  Goverment  will  make
working?  changes in the rules of the Pension System regarding 
Does this worry you?
[] Not applicable (does not work)
How probable is it  How much do
26.  How much are you worried that you or a family member  that the system's  these changes
will  suffer  from  the  following  situations?  (Using a scale  rules will change ...  ?  worry you?
from  I to  10,  where Level  I  indicates "no worry"'  and
Level IO  indicates "maximum worry").  Changes in  rules  I Very probable  (1  indicates not
2 Probable  worried, 10
3 A bit probable  indicates maximum
Situation  Level  4 No probability  woy)
5 Don't know
a. Being unable to work in old age
b. Prolonged (expensive)  sickness  a. Payment of pension
c. Physical or mental incapacity  b  Level of contrbutions
d. Accident  c. Levei of commissions
e. Unemployment  d Access to funds in  case
of emergency
f. Loss of income from the death of  d Security of investments
spouse or partner
e.  Switching  between
g. Support of dependent  relatives (care  AFPs
for elderly, etc.)
h. Unforseen  responsibility for dependent
relatives (new child, disabled relative,
unexpected  elderly family,  etc)
i. Other:
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30.  Who  do  you  believe  should  be  responsible  for  38.  Since that time, have there been periods  when you did
financing pensions?  not contribute?
I [  ] Worker only  - Go to Q32  I [  ] Yes,  For how long?  _  years _  months
2 [  ] Employer only  4  Go to Q32  2[ ]No
3 [] Government only  - Go to Q31
4 [  ] Worker and employer  39.  Are you presently receiving a pension  for retirement, as a
5 [  ] Worker and the Government  survivor, or for disability?
6 [  ] Employer and the Government
7 [  ] Worker, Employer and Government  Institution  For Retirement  As survivor/orphan
or for disability
31.  Arrange  in  order  of  responsibility  (If respondent  I INP
indicated  2 responsible actors, order as I'  and  2 n.  If  2  CANAEMPU
respondent indicated  3 responsible  actors, order as I',  3 EMPART
2"" and 3 d  4 AFP,  Which?
/  ~~~~~~~~~5  CAPREDENA
6  DIPRECA
Worker  7 Other - Specify:
___  Employer  18 Not receiving
Government (Central and Local)  Indicate the amount  $  $
32.  ,What  aspect  of  the  AFP  system  should  the  40.  Are  you  our your  spouse  currently  contributing  to  a
government  guarantee?  (Only  to  those  respondents  pension system?
who mentioned the Government in question 30).
You  Spouse
I [ ] That the AFPs not invest irresponsibly  I f  ]  I [ ] Yes, to INP
2 [  ] A minimum return  2f]  2[  ]Yes, to CANAEMPU
3 [  ] That the AFPs not go bankrupt  3[  ]  3[  ]Yes, to EMPART
4 [ ] Other - Specify:  4[  4[  ]Yes to AFP,
33.  Do you have  family and/or friends  who contribute  to  You:  Spouse:
an AFP account?
5[]  5f  ]Yes, to CAPREDENA
I [] Yes  6[]  6 [Yes,  to DIPRECA
2[  ]No  7[]  7[ ]Other
8 [  ]f  ] Not contributing.  - Go to Q59
34.  Did  family  and/or  friends  ever  recommend  that  you
contribute to an AFP account?  41.  Why do you contribute to the Pension System?
I[] Yes  Note: Respondent can choose more than one response.  If
2 [  ] No  respondent selects a title in block letters, probe using options
under the title in block letters.
35.  Have you ever recommended  to  family and/or friends
that they should contribute to an AFP account?  011] Because  it is mandatory
02 [  I'm worried about income  in old age
I[  ] Yes  03 [] To receive the minimum  guaranteed pension
2[  ]No  041 I have to in order to have FONASA or ISAPRE
coverage
Please allow us to  ask you now  about your present status In  05 [ ]I want disability coverage
the Pension SystenL  06 [ ] I want to leave a survivor benefit to my spouse
and kids
36.  Are  you currently  affiliated  in a Pension  System?  (if  07 []I don't think my spouse and kids will take care
the respondent  is retired, consider them affiliated)  of me in the future
08 [] There are no better options
I[  ]Yes  Go to Q37  &  []THE PENSION FUNDS ARE AN
2[  ]No  Go to 058  ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT,
BECAUSE...
37.  What year did you contribute  for the first time?  11  [  ] minimum return guarantee
12 [  ] good retums
Year:  19  13 [  ] low commissions
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14  [  good investments
15  [  allow tax deductions  48.  Do you think that when you reach the retirement age,
you will have a sufficient balance in your individual
20 [  ]  Another reason - Specify:  account to at least receive the minimum pension for
life?
Note:  If respondent contributes  to AFP, go to Q42  l
If respondent  contributes to another  system,  go to Q52  I  1 [  Yes
2 [1No
3[  ]Don't know
42.  When was the last time you received an AFP statement?
Month of  Year  49.  Do you, or  does your  employer  on your behalf,  make
voluntary contributions to your AFP?
[ ] Does not receive a statement  from AFP
1 [ ] Yes, in account  1  (you can't withdraw)
2 [1] Yes  in account  2 (you can withdraw)
3 [ ]No  - Goto Q52
43.  Was the return earned by your pension  fund among...?
I [] The three best  50.  How  much  money  do  you  contribute  voluntarily  to
2  [ ]The three worst  your AFP account?
3 [1]  Average
$ 3  Average  in account one
To what period are you referring?  (you can't withdraw)
J J  Looked up information in statement  $  in account two
(you can withdraw)
44.  What  commission  does  your  AFP  charge  to  manage  51.  Why do you make voluntary contributions?
your savings? 1 [  II  want a higher pension
1 [  ] The three best  2 []I want greater tax deductions
2 [  ] The three worst  3 [  I want a better return
3 [  Average  4 []I want to qualify for early retirement
5  [1  Other:  are_you_eferring
To what period are you referring?  52.  Would you  like to  contribute  more  or less than you
I I Looked up information in statement  currently contribute?
I [ ] Yes, more
45.  Who pays the commissions charged by your AFP?  2 [  Yes,  less
3 [  Same  Go to Q54
I [] You  and your salary  is discounted  53.  If  you  could  choose  the  amount  of  your  pension
2  [  ] You, and your pension is discounted  contributions,  what  percentage  of your total  monthly
3 [  ] Your employer  income  would you contribute?
4 [IThe Government
5 [  Split between you and your employer  % of total monthly income
6[  ]Don't know
54.  What other insurance plans do you (or your
46.  How much doyou pay your AFP in commissions?  employer) have?
$  (pesos)  [  ] Don't know  1 [  I  Work injury insurance
2 [  ] Automobile insurance
3 [  Life insurance  (other than AFP)
47.  You make contributions  on .... ?  4 [  ] Severance  or unemployment  insurance 5 [  ] Disability insurance (other than AFP)
I [] The minimum  salary  6 [] Health insurance  ISAPRE or FONASA
2 [  ] A salary below your actual salary  7 [] Complementary health insurance
3 [  1 Your entire salary/income  8 [  ] Other - Specify:
9 [16None
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55.  In addition to the Pension System, how are you  59.  Have you ever contributed to a Pension System?
saving/investing for income security in old age?
(multiple responses allowed)  I [  ] Yes
2[  ]No  4GotoQ61
I [ ]I do not save, b/c I cannot save
2 []I do not save/invest,  I spend  60.  When was the last time you contributed to a Pension
3 [ ] Regular savings accounts  at banks  System?
4 [  Purchase  property
S [] An own business  Month, of  Year
6 [  Educating kids
7  [  Loans to friends/family at interest  61.  Why do you not contribute to the Pension System?
8 [  Invest in shares
9 [ ] Life insurance  with savings option  Note:  Respondent can choose more than one response.  If
10 [  ] Annuity  respondent  selects a title in block letters, probe using options
11  [ ] Other - Specify:  under the title in block letters.
& []I AM NOT (WAS NOT) OBLIGATED  TO:
56.  If you weren't forced to contribute to the Pension  11  [ ] I am not working
System how would you save/invest for income  12 [ ] I am self employed
security in old age? (multiple responses allowed)  13 [  ] I don't have enough to save
14 [  ] Other -Specify:
I [ ] I do not save, b/c I cannot save
2 [] I do not save/invest,  I spend  & []I AM (WAS)  OBLIGATED TO BUT CAN (COULD)
3 [  Regular savings accounts at banks  NOT:
4 [] Purchase  property  21[  ] I'm not interested (don't want to)
5 [  An own business  22 [  ] My employer does not let me
6 [  Educating kids  23 [  ] My employer would lower my take
7 [  Loans to friends/family  at interest  home pay if I contribute
8 [] Invest in shares  24 [  ] I don't have enough money
9 [ ]Life insurance with savings option  25 [  ] Other -Specify:
10 [  ]Annuity
11 [ ] Other - Specify:  d&  [  CONTRIBUTING  DOES NOT ATTRACT ME:
31 [  ] I prefer to spend my money today, rather
than save for the future
57.  What portion of your current  monthly income do you  32 [  ] You have to contribute  for too many
think you will need to meet  your expenses  when you  years to receive a pension
can no longer work?  33 []I contributed once, and wasn't satisfied
Specify
I [  ] Less than 30%  33 []I cannot withdraw my savings in an
2 [  ] Between 30% and 50%  emergency
3 [  ] Between 50% and 75%  & [II HAVE (HAD) OTHER ALTERNATIVES
4 [  ] Between 75%  and 100%  41  [  ] My spouse cares for me and will care for
5 [  ]100%  me in the future
6 [  ] More than  100% of current income  42 [ ] My children will care for me
43 [ ] Other family members will care for me
Note:  Thefollowing  questions only to respondents  who are  44 [  ] I'm saving for myself,
not or who have never contributed to the pension systemL  How?
45 []I have other insurance
58.  Is your spouse contributing to the Pension System?  Which?
I[] Yes, to INP  & []IT IS NOT AN ATTRACTIVE  SAVINGS OPTION
2 1  Yes, to CANAEMPU  51 [ ] I cannot withdraw my savings in
3 [  Yes, to EMPART  emergencies
411]  Yes to AFP, which?  52 [  ] Returns are low
5 1  Yes, to CAPREDENA  53 [  ] No discounts in taxes
6 [ ] Yes, to DIPRECA  54 [  ] AFPs make risky investments
7 [  Other, Specify  55  [ ] AFP commissions are too high
8 [  Does Not contribute  56 [ ] Other - Specify:
91] Does not have spouse  & []I DON'T (DIDN'T) KNOW - DON'T HAVE
ENOUGH INFORMATION
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61  [  ] An AFP salesperson never came to talk  MODULE IV.  FINANCIAL STRATEGIES
to me  We would now like to ask you several questions about  your
62 [ ] My employer never spoke to me about  financial  activities:
the Pension System
Deposits
62.  Would you contribute to the Pension System if ....  ?  1  2  3
65.  Do you have money deposited in ...?
Note: Respondent can choose more than one response.  Only  (Can mark more than one alternative)
if respondent selects the  title in  block  letters,  "IT  WERE
ECONOMICALLY  ATTRACTIVE..."  etc.  ,  then  probe  1.  Checking  account
reading options 11 to 17.  2. Savings account
3. Certificate of deposit in pesos
01  [ ] You were a dependent worker (with a boss)  4. Certificate of deposit in dollars
02 [] You had enough money to save  5.  Mutual funds
03 [  ] You had more information  6. Life insurance with savings option
04 [ ] You did not have negative previous experiences  7. None of the above  -- Go to Q72
05 [] You did not expect your spouse and kids to care
for you in the future  66.  Where is your money deposited?
& []IT WERE ECONOMICALLY  ATTRACTIVE
11  [  ] With higher returns  I. State Bank
12 [  ] With tax deductions/incentives  2. Commercial  bank
13 [  ] With safer investments  3. Life insurance company
14 [  I Lower commissions  4. Credit union - savings and loan
15 [  ] With the possibility of withdrawing  5. Mutual fund
funds in case of emergency  6. At home
16 [ ] Could chose level of my contribution  7. Other place,  Specify:
18  [  ] Other - Specify:
67.  How easily can you withdraw your
20 [] Other - Specify:  savings?
63.  If you could chose the amount of your contributions to  1. Immediately
the Pension System, how much would you contribute  2. With 5 days notice
every month?  3. With 5 to 30 days notice
4. With more than a month's notice
$ ____________  pesos a month  5. Does not know
68.  What do you loose if you withdraw 64.  In what alternative to the Pension System do you  your money before the agreed period?
invest your savings?  (multiple responses allowed)
1.  Loose the interest
2 []I do not invest, I spend  2. Loose a portion of saved funds 3  ontinet  pn  3. Don't loose anything
3  Regular savings accounts at banks  4. Don't know  _
4 [1 Purchase  property  69. What rate of interest do they pay you?
5 [  ] An own business%
6 [1 Educating kids
7 [] Loans to friends/family at interest  70. How often?
8 [  ] Invest in shares
9 [  Life insurance with savings option  1. Monthly
10 [  ] Annuity  2. Every 6 months
11  [  ] Other- Specify:  3. Annually
4. None
71. How long does it take you to get from
your house to the place where you have
this account or deposit?
hour y  minutes
65Appendix Two
72.  How long does  it take you to get to the nearest bank?  33 [  ] I don't have property  (to guarantee loan)
34 [  ] I don't have guarantees (references)
______  hours and  minutes  35 [  ] No stable income
36 [  They don't attend to people  like me
(sex, race, religious discrimination)
73.  Are  you  (or  were  you  10  years  ago)  the  owner  of:  37 [  I'm still paying-off an earlier loan
(Multiple responses are allowed).  38 [  Other - Specify:
Today  10 Years ago  & [ ] WOULD NOT HAVE MET MY FINANCIAL
NEEDS:
I [  I  [  ] Your home ?  41 [ ] The size of the loan I applied for was too big
2 [  2 [] Some other house?  42 [ ] The size of the loan I applied for was too small
3 [  3 [] Land or agricultural property?  45 [ ] Repayment period was too long
4 [  4 [] Share  in an agricultural collective  46 [ ] Repayment period was too short
5 [  5 [] Cattle, sheep, farm animals
6 [  6  1  Vehicle?  & [IT  WAS TOO EXPENSIVE
7 [  7 [  Tools and work machinery?  51  [ ] Interest rate too high
8 [  8  [  Financial assets/shares?  52 [  ] Commissions  are too high
9[  ]  9[  ]Loans to friends and family?
10[  ]  I0[  ]Other -Specify:_  &[  ]IT WAS TOO DIFFICULT
11  1  11  [  ] No invests/property  61  [  ] Process was too bureaucratic
62 [  ] Process was too risky
74.  In the last 12 months did you receive income from a  63 [  ] Other - Specify:
property in the form of a dividend or rent?
70 [  ]OTHER Specify:
-Go  to Q88
75.  In the last  12 months have you applied for a
loan/credit?  78.  Why were you not granted the loan/credit? (Multiple
responses allowed).
I [] Yes, applied
2.[  ] No, did not apply  4Go to Q77  1 [  ] No guarantees (references)
2 [  ] No property (with which to guarantee  loan)
76  The last time you applied for a loan, were you granted  5 [  ] No job
a loan/credit?  4 [  ] Have a "precarious" job
5 [ ] Bad credit report/history (Boletin Comercial,
1 [  I Yes  -Go  to Q80  DICOM,  P. Verde)
2 [ ] No  -Go  to Q78  6 [  ] No stable income
7 [  ] Not up to date with tax payments
8 [  ] They did not say why
77.  Why did you not apply for loan/credit?  9 [  ] Other - Specify:
Note: Respondent can choose more than one response.  If  79.  What did you do instead?
respondent selects a title in block letters, probe using options
under the title in block letters.  Specify
&[  I DID NOT NEED IT
11  [ ] I prefer to use only my own resources  4Go to Q88
12 [  ] I have access to other sources of help from family
and friends  80.  Who granted you the loan, credit?
15 [ ] Other - Specify:
I [  ] Bank
& []I DID NOT KNOW HOW TO APPLY  2 [  Other commercial lender (financiera)
21  [  I Did not have enough information  3 [  Compensation  fund (caja de compensacion)
22 [ ] There were no lending institutions  or money  7 [  Foundation/charitable  organisation
lenders nearby  4 [  Official housing finance  institution
25 [ ] Other - Specify:  (CORFO, SERVIU)
5 [ ] City government
& []I THOUGH I WOULD NEVER GET IT  6 [ ] Money lender
31  [ ]I don't have a job  7 [ ] Friend or family member
32 [ ] I have a "precarious",  unstable job  8 [  ] Other - Specify:
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81.  What is the (nominal)  rate of interest you are paying on  10 [  ]Payment of debts
the loan/credit?  11  [1 Other use for small/agricultural business.
Specify:
I [  ] Monthly  %
B. In the home
2 [  ] Annually  %
I [1 Appliances (stove,  blender,)
3 [ ] I don't pay interest  2 [  Electric goods for the home (radio, TV)
3 [  Emergency  or illness
82.  What is the period  for repayment of the loan/credit?  4 [  Payment of household debt
5 [  Purchase of a house
I [  ] Contract for  I month  6 [  Education
2 [  Between  I and 6 months  7 [  Construction  of a house
5 [  ] Between 6 and 12 months  8 [  Remodeling or extending the home
4  Between  I and 2 years  9 [  Vehicle or bicycle  for the home
5[  ]Between 2 and 5 years  10 [  Other household use.
6 [  ] Longer than five years  Specify:
83.  How often do you make payments?
Note: The questions on flnancial  awareness are  posed to aUl
I [ ] Daily  respondents
2 [ ] Weekly
5 [] Monthly  88.  What was the rate of inflation  in the last 12  months?
4 [] Every 5 months
5 [] Every 6 months  I [  Less than 2%
6 [] Annually  2  Between 2%  and 5%
7 [ ] Other - Specify:  3[  ] Between 5% and 10%
41[  ]More than 10%
84.  How much are your payments?  5 [  ] Does not know
$  in pesos, or US$  89.  What  was the national  unemployment  rate  in the  last
trimester?
85.  When did you receive the loan/credit?  I  ] Less than  10%
2  2  ]Between  10% and 12%
Month:  ,and  Year:  3 [ ]Between  12%  and 16%
4[  ]More than 16%
5 [I ] Does not know
86.  Have you finished paying back the loan ?
90.  Do you know how much the price of the dollar has
I [] Yes  changed in the last year?
2 [ ]No,  How much do you have left to pay?
I [1 Rose more than $100
2 [  Rose between  $50 and $100
$  pesos or US$  3  Rose between  $1 and $50
4  Fell between $1 and $50
5 []Fell between $50 and $100
87.  What did you use the money from the loan/credit for?  6  1 Has not changed
(don 't read  out all the options)  7[  ] Does not know
A. Your business or farming activity  91.  Do you know what was the value of the Santiago
Stock Market Index (IPSA) last week?
I  [1 Work tools
2 [  Machinery
3 [  Equipment and furnishings
4 [  Other equipment  Does not know
5 [] Vehicle or bicycle for work
6 [  Purchase of raw materials
7 [  Purchase of property
8 [  Purchase of animals
9 [  ] Purchase of sale goods for the business
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MODULE V.  INTER AND INTRA HOUSEHOLD STRATEGIES
We would now like to askyou some questions about the assistance  youlyour household gives to family andfriends living
outside  your household
92. Do you, or does someone in your household, give assistance to family and/or friends outside of your home,  in the form  of
money, visits, purchase of food or goods, or other fofrms of help?
I  [  ] Yes
2 rNo 4Go to Q93
Who do you help?  How do you help?  If your help is in the  How often do you help?  Do these family or  Where do they live?
(relation to the  forn  of money,  on  friends contnbute
respondent)  what is that money  to.  ?
spent
9
I Ex-spouse or  I Care for minors or  I Food, or other basic  I Daily  I Contributes  I Same neighbourhood
partner  elders  goods such as  2 Once a week  2 Don't contnbute  2 Same distnct
2 Son/Daughter  2 Regular visits for  clothes  4 Twice a month  3 Don't know  3 Same city
4 Father/Mother  reasons not  2 HH durables like  5  Every month  4 Doesn't apply  4 Another city
5 F or M in Law  mentioned  fridge, stove etc  6 Every three  months  5 Another rural area
7 S or D in Law  3 Food or other basic  3 Education expenses  7 Every six months  6 Another country in Latin
8 Grandchild  goods  4 Health expenses  8 Yearly  Amenca
9 Brother/sister  4 HH Durables like  5 Credit payments  7 In Europe or the US
10 B or S  in law  fridge, or stove  etc.  6 House  payments  8 Another country
11 Other family  5 Machinery or tools  7 Other - Specify
12 Non family  6 Money (except for  8 Does not know
13 Employees  alimony)
7 Alimony
8 Other - SpecifV  _  =  C  =_d_=ef
a  __  b  __c  _  _  d  e  f
2-I-  _  -=_  _  __ __  _  ___  =  ___  _
21  _  __  __  _  l_  _  _  _  _  _
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93. Do you, or does someone in your household, receive assistance to family and/or friends outside of your home,  in the
form of money, visits, purchase of food or goods,  or other forms of help?
I [ ] Yes
2[  ]No -Go  to Q94
Who do you receive  What form does that  If your help is in the  How often do you  Do these famnily or  Where do they live?
help? (relation to the  help take?  form of money, on  receive help?  friends contnbute  to
respondent)  what is that money  the Pension System?
spent?
I Ex-spouse or  I Care for minors or  I Food, or other basic  I Daily  I Contributes  I Same neighbourhood
partner  elders  goods such as  2 Once a week  2 Don't contribute  2 Same distnct
2 Son/Daughter  2 Regular visits for  clothes  4 Twice a month  3 Don't know  3 Same city
4 Father/Mother  reasons not  2 HH durables like  5 Every month  4 Doesn't apply  4 Another city
5 F or M in Law  mentioned  fndge, stove etc  6 Every three months  5 Another rural  area
7 S or D in Law  3 Food or other basic  3 Education  expenses  7 Every six months  6 Another country in Latin
8 Grandchild  goods  4 Health expenses  8 Yearly  America
9 Brother/sister  4 HH Durables like  5 Credit payments  7 In Europe or the US
10 B or S in law  fndge, or stove etc.  6 House payments  8 Another country
11  Other family  5 Machinery or tools  7 Other - Specify
12 Non family  6 Money (except for  8 Does not know
13 Employees  alimony)
7 Alimony
8 Other- Specify
a  b  c  d  e  f
Male:  ____and  Female:  ___  _a.  What level of
education  did your
95.  How many children do you expect to have?  parents reach?
I Primary
Total:  2 Secondary 3 CFT
4 P. Institute
96.  How much money do you spend on your children's  5 University
education?  6 Other, Specify
b. Are they alive?
$  every month  I  Yes
2 No
O [] Not Applicable  Go to Q97.d
c.  How old are they?
97.  Now I'd like to ask you several questions about your  4Go to Q98
parents  d.  At what age did they
die?
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98.  How do you care for your parents?  104  On how many people outside your household - family
or friends - could you rely on in case of an economic
I [ ] Visiting when they are sick  -i  Go to QIOO  emergency?
2 [] With regular visits  - Go to QIOO
3 [] By giving money  4  Go to QIOO  No. of People
4[  ] Helping them with tasks  i  Go to Q100
5 [] In other ways.  - Go to QIOO  105  Do you have persons for whom you are economically
Specify:  responsible,  who are...:
6 [] I do not provide care  for my parents
7 [] Not applicable  I [ ] Pregnant
2[ ]ll
99.  Why do you not provide care for your parents?  5 [  Likely to become  ill
(Respondent can  pick more than one option)  4 [ ] Disabled
5[  ]None of the above
I [1 We don't have time
2  [ ] We don't have money
3  1 They are in good health and don't need
4 [  ] They are in a good economic situation
5  [  Other siblings are caring for them
6 [  ] They receive old age and survivor pensions
7 [  Other - Specify:
100.  What role do household members over 65 play in the
home?
Male  Female
I [1  I [1  Work and contribute to HH income
2 [  2 [  Stay at home doing HH chores, e.g.
caring for children
3[1  3  Stay at home and don't do any HH chores
4[  ]  4[  ]  Other-  Specify:
5 [  5 [  Not applicable
101.  Do you expect to live with one of your children in old
age?
I [  ] Yes, in the house of a son
2  [  Yes, in the house of a daughter
3[  ]No
102.  Do you expect your children to care for you when you
can no longer care for yourself?
I [ ]Yes, a son
2 [ ] Yes, a daughter
3 [No,  Why not?
4 [  Does not know
103  How many people outside of your household - family




MODULE VI.  LABOR STRATEGIES
106.  Did you work for money last week?
I Yes  4  Go to Ql  l.a
2 No
107.  If  you  did  not  work  last  week,  were  you  temporarily
absent  on  leave,  sick  leave,  vacation,  strike,  or  for
another reason?
I Yes - Go to Ql  l.a
2No
108.  Have you looked for paid work in the last  12 months?
I Yes,  for the first time  -*Go to Q109 and Q1 12
2 Yes, l'm unemployed  Go to Q109 and QI ll.a
3No 4GotoQll0
109.  How long have you been  looking for paid work?
4Go to QlIl.a
110.  Why did you not look for paid work?
I Retired
2 Doing non-paid family work
5 Household  owner  - Go to Q122
4 Student  - Go to Q122
5 Disabled or Elderly  - Go to Q122
6 Other, Specify  - Go to Q122
II  .b Apart from your  I lI.c Do you have
I lI.a  Please describe your main (principal) job, or the job you  main job, do you  another job in
recently lost  have another job?  addition to those
mentioned?
1[ ]Yes  I Yes
2 [No  - Go to Q123  2 No 4  Go to Q123
Main (principal) job  Second  job  Third job
112.  What is (was) your job - what do (did) you do?
113.  Occupational  (job) category:
I  Employer - boss
2 Self employed
5 Employee
4 Worker (physical work)
5 Non  resident domestic service
6 Resident domestic  service
7 Non-paid family member
8 Soldier & Police forces
114.  What  does  the  firm,  (institution  or business)  you  work
(worked) for do?
115.  Does  this  firm,  (institution  or business)  belong  to  the
public or to the private sector?
I Public institution or business
2 Private institution or business
5 International  organisation
116.  How  many  people  work  in  this  firm  (institution  or
business)?
I One person
2  2 to  5 persons
5  6 to  9 persons
4  10 to  49 persons
5  50 to  199 persons
6  200 or more persons
9  Doesn't know
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117.  Did you sign a contract for your job?
I Yes, open-ended  contract
2 Yes, time bound contract
5 Yes, but I don't know the terms of contract
4 No, but my job is open-ended
5 No, I did not sign a contract
6 Don't know, don't remember
118.a.  Where do you do your job?
I At home, self employed
2 At home,  employed
5  In another household
4 Local workshop attached to a home
5 Independent establishment
6 Agricultural  farm
7 Fishery
8 In a  household/home
9 In public places (street, parks, etc.)
10 Transport  (air, sea,  land)
11  Other, Specify
118.b.  In  the  last  month  what  is  your  take-home  (net,  liquid)
income?
119.  How long have you worked at this job?
Year(s)  and  Year(s)  and  Year(s)  and
(Interviewer. Include number of  years and months).
Month(s)  Month(s)  Month(s)
120.  How  many hours a day, and days a week did you work in
the last month?  Hours a day:  and  Hours a day:  and  Hours a day:  and
Days a week:  Days a week:  _  Days a week:
121.  Did you receive other  income  from your MAIN such  as:
(Respondent can give multiple responses).
I Bonuses
2 Income from sale of agricultural goods  Type  :  Type  :  Type  :
3  Extra hours
4 Family allowances
5 Other.  Specify:  Amount: $  Amount: $  Amount: $_
6 Did not receive any other income
122.  In the last month, did you receive income from any of the following public subsidies: (Respondent can give multiple responses)
1. No  2. Yes  Amount
1. Social assistance pension,  PASIS  [  ]  [  $
2. Single family subsidy,  SUF  [  ]  [  ]  $
3.  Severance subsidy  [  ]  []  $
4. Did not receive any of these subsidies  []
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123.  How  much  money  do you  contribute  every  month  to  Go to 0130 on the next  anee
your household's  total income?
$  pesos per month  128.  How long have you been looking?
124.  Would you like to be doing the same job for the next
129.  What  is the minimum  salary you would be  willing to
I [  ] 3 months  accept for the additional job?
2 [ ] 6 months
5 []I year  $  per hour
4 [ ] More than a year
5 [  Don't want  $  per day
6 [  ] Doesn't know
7 [ ] Not applcable  $  per month
125.  If you are self-employed a year from now would you
want to:  [last question on next page]
1 [  ] remain self employed
2 [  ] find employment - leave self employment
126.  In  the  past  month,  have  you  been  looking  for  an
additional  job  that  will  generate  additional  income?
I [  ] Yes.  i  Go to P128
2[  ]No
127.  Why not?
(multiple responses allowed).
I []  I did not (do not) need to
2  [  ] I already have additional jobs
5  [  ] I'm waiting to hear about an additional job I
applied for
4  [  ] I'm waiting to start a new job
5  [  I'm tired of looking
6  [  ]I have domestic (household) responsibilities
7 [  Health and age reasons
8  [  ] Other - Specify:
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130  Since November of last year (1998) until today:
*  Did someone in your house hold loose their job? or
*  Did someone  in your house hold who did not work in November  1998,  begin to work since then?
I [] Yes, who? 4CONTINUE
2r  No  END  OF SURVEY
a.  Relation to the  b. Lost job or began to  c. For how long  d.  How long had  e. What happened?  f. What is their job
respondent  work?  were they without  they been working  or activity now?
work?  in that activity?  If they lost a job
I HH Head
2 Spouse/partner  I Lost job - Go to c  Take down time and  1.  Found a new job
3 Son/Daughter  2 Began to work or self  4  Go toe  3.  Has not found ajob
4 Mother/Father  employed activity  4. Retumed to the same job
5WMFinlaw  -*Gotod
6 S/D in law  If they answered 3 or 4
7 Grandson/daughtr  END OF SURVEY
8 Brother/Sister
9 B/S in law  Started work or self
10 Other family  employed activity
11  Non family
5  Remained in  tde same
activity
6 Changed job or activity
7 Lost job/stopped activity
If they answered  7
___________  __________  END OF SURVEY
a  b  c  d  e  f
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